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I. INTRODUCTION
An important provision in each of the final judgments in the gov-
ernment's Microsoft antitrust case requires Microsoft to "make
available" to software developers the communications protocols that
Windows client operating systems use to interoperate "natively" (that is,
without adding software) with Microsoft server operating systems in
corporate networks or over the Internet.' The short-term goal of the pro-
vision is to allow developers, as licensees of the protocols, to write
applications for non-Microsoft server operating systems that interoperate
with Windows client computers in the same ways that applications writ-
ten for Microsoft's server operating systems interoperate with Windows
clients.2 The long-term goal is to preserve, in the network context, the
platform threat to the Windows monopoly that was the focus of the gov-
ernment's theory of monopolization. The platform threat was the
possibility that "middleware," like Netscape's browser or Sun's Java
technologies, might evolve into a platform for other applications and
thus erode the "applications barrier to entry" that protects Windows. This
was the threat that the courts held Microsoft illegally thwarted by its
contracts and product design.4 The protocol licensing provision rests on
the assumption that middleware running on servers might also pose a
platform threat to the Windows monopoly of client operating systems.
District Judge Kollar-Kotelly, in entering the final judgments, singled out
this provision as the key to assuring that the other provisions do not be-
come irrelevant as more applications move to servers in local networks
or the Internet! The provision has, however, proven to be by far the most
difficult to implement. We argue in this Article that the provision has not
1. Final Judgment § Ill.E, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232(CKK), 2002
WL 31654530 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Consent Decree]; States' Final Judgment,
§ HLI.E, New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 E Supp. 2d 76, 269 (D.D.C. 2002) [hereinafter
D.D.C. States Remedy 2002]. The Judgments have been amended to extend the term of this
provision. Modified Final Judgment, § IV.E, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(CKK) (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2l8300/
218339.pdf.
Because of the multitude opinions by various courts in the Microsoft litigation, the cus-
tom of numbering opinions by Roman numeral for citation (e.g., Microsoft V) is confusing and
impractical. Consequently, for repeated citations of Microsoft opinions, we adopt the strategy
of WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECH-
NOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 203-42 (2007), which includes the court, date and a
citation of the volume and page number (e.g., D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 E Supp. 2d at
269).
2. See infra Part III.C.2.
3. See infra Part III.C.2.
4. See infra Part II.
5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 192 (D.D.C. 2002) [herein-
after D.D.C. Tunney Act 2002].
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accomplished its purpose and that courts and policymakers can draw
some hard lessons from the experience.
A fundamental assumption of American antitrust policy is that pri-
vate contracting will ordinarily erode monopolies and enhance social
wealth better than a governmentally directed process.6 By prohibiting
"monopolization" and agreements "in restraint of trade,' 7 and by assign-
ing the interpretation of those terms to courts in the process of litigation,
Congress rejected the view that markets generally benefit from continu-
ous governmental supervision.8 Thus, wherever possible, antitrust
remedies should rely on the market's self-correcting forces rather than
replace them with governmental mandates. The goal of remedies is to
"restore competition" 9 by "eliminating the consequences of the illegal
conduct."' The court's remedial task is not to create ideal competitive
conditions or to direct equitable market outcomes, but to restore eco-
nomic conditions that would have existed had the offenses not occurred.
In doing so, the court's role is to facilitate market processes by removing
specific monopolistic impediments.
Antitrust courts ordinarily can best achieve the goal of restoring
competition by imposing monetary penalties that deter anticompetitive
conduct." The penalty for an antitrust offense is the sum of the fines and
private treble damage awards imposed in the initial and follow-on litiga-
tion. If the expected penalties make illegal conduct unprofitable, the
offender and others like it will not undertake the conduct. Penalties, of
course, should not be arbitrarily large because of the danger that they
will deter "lawful conduct at the border of the prohibition. Overdeter-
rence is a special danger in antitrust, where "the line between efficient
and inefficient conduct is often fuzzy.' 3 American antitrust law ad-
dresses this concern through the doctrine of antitrust injury, which
6. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (observing that "the free-
dom of the individual right to contract when not unduly or improperly exercised [is] the most
efficient means for the prevention of monopoly" (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911)).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
8. William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 37 (1991).
9. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961); see
also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Devising a Microsoft Remedy that Serves Consum-
ers, 9 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 691 (2001); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, A
(Cautionary) Note on Remedies in the Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 25 (Summer 1999). See
generally, PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 1, at 203-42.
10. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698 (1978).
11. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 266-67 (2d ed. 2001); see also William H.
Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1452-62 (1985)
(describing the role of the standard of optimal deterrence in antitrust damages).
12. Posner, supra note 11, at 267.
13. Id.
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requires damages to be causally linked to the inefficiency associated
with the defendant's conduct.'4 If courts impose an appropriate deterrent
penalty, no further remedies should be necessary because the change in
the offender's incentives should prevent recurrence of the offense. This
outcome is more efficient and therefore preferable to any form of equita-
ble relief, which necessarily imposes direct administrative costs, and
may impose far greater indirect costs by inhibiting efficient conduct.
Equitable remedies may be needed where antitrust litigation is un-
able to identify or measure the harm from inefficient conduct. One
example might be tacit collusion, the coordination of pricing by rivals
without the sort of agreement required by section 1 of the Sherman Act.'"
In these circumstances, it may be necessary to enjoin mergers that make
tacit collusion more likely. Exclusionary practices ordinarily pose fewer
difficulties because they "impose costs on competing firms that are ordi-
narily quantifiable," and thus can form the basis of damage actions to
impose an appropriate penalty.'6 Exclusionary practices may also result
in measurable overcharges that the offender's customers can recover in
damages. Nevertheless, in some cases it may be appropriate for courts to
enjoin narrowly defined exclusionary practices that the record shows
have proven anticompetitive.'7
Once antitrust courts move beyond the imposition of penalties and
the entry of focused injunctions, they enter foreign territory. Orders pro-
hibiting conduct that was never held illegal, although sometimes
permissible,' 8 are less likely to remove a real impediment to market func-
tions and are more likely to have unintentional anticompetitive
consequences. Structural relief may be needed to dissolve recent merg-
ers, but in most instances the enormous direct and indirect costs of court-
ordered divestiture have not proven to be justified by any long-term
competitive benefits to consumers.19
14. Page, supra note 11, at 1459-83.
15. Posner, supra note 11, at 268.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 107. ("When the defendant's misconduct consists of exclusionary practices
rather than of acquisitions, an award of damages for the harm caused by the practices or an
injunction against their continuation will normally be an adequate remedy.").
18. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 132 (1969) ("In exercis-
ing its equitable jurisdiction, '(a) federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of
the same type or class as unlawful acts which the court has found to have been committed or
whose commission in the future unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from the defen-
dant's conduct in the past.' ") (citation omitted).
19. See generally Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman
Act Monopolization Cases, 80 OR. L. REV. 109 (2001); see also PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note
1, at 1-32. An important exception is the AT&T consent decree, which, for all its shortcom-
ings, probably benefited consumers. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 111 (calling the AT&T
divestiture "the most successful antitrust structural remedy in history"); Clement G. Krouse, et
Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy
Even more problematic are "regulatory decrees," which Judge Pos-
ner characterizes as "a confession of failure to restore competitive
conditions and a sign that the case was probably ill conceived. 20 Then-
professor Stephen Breyer notes that antitrust enforcers typically "act
negatively" to prohibit anticompetitive conduct and "[o]nly rarely ...
create the detailed web of affirmative legal obligations that characterizes
classical regulation."2' Dennis Carlton and Randall Picker similarly ob-
serve that "[a]ntitrust can say no but struggles with saying yes" because
it "is a poor framework for price setting or for establishing affirmative
duties toward rivals. 22 The Supreme Court recently endorsed a similar
view in Trinko, observing that "[e]nforced sharing [of a defendant's pro-
ductive resources] ... requires antitrust courts to act as central planners,
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing-a role
for which they are ill suited."23
Courts are ill suited to such a role because federal judges are gener-
alists with diverse caseloads and with limited abilities within an
adversary system to monitor market conditions continuously. These
al., The Bell System Divestiture/Deregulation and Efficiency of the Operating Companies, 42
J.L. & ECON. 61 (1999) (offering data showing the divestiture enhanced efficiency of the local
exchange). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE 58 (2007) (arguing that the AT&T "decree suffered from an
excess of ambition and from a lack of focus and finitude" because Judge Harold Greene
"could not control the unruly set of forces his divestiture... set in motion").
20. POSNER, supra note 11, at 273; see also Deborah Platt Majoras, Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Remedies in the United States: Adhering to Sound Principles in a
Multi-faceted Scheme 6 (2002) (insisting that the Antitrust Division is "not a regulatory
body"), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200354.pdf.
21. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 156-57 (1982). But cf Spencer
Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77
OR. L. REV. 1383 (1998) (showing that antitrust enforcement agencies have become more
regulatory in recent years, in a variety of contexts, including merger consent decrees that may
involve compulsory licensing and other continuing obligations).
22. Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation, John M. Olin Law
& Econ. Working Paper No. 312 at 1 (2d Series, 2004) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/
SSRNID937020_code249436.pdfabstractid=937020&mirid=l (follow "Download Document"
hyperlink). The authors continue:
Price setting in a non-market context often requires detailed industry knowledge
and often turns on political decisions about levels of service and the rate of return to
capital needed to provide those services. The virtue and vice of federal judges is
they are generalists, not industry specialists, and, once appointed, they are insulated
from the political process. If there is a natural monopoly and prices need to be set
or we are going to create a duty to, say, share an incumbent's phone network with
an entrant, the evidence suggests that it is generally best to do that through (enlight-
ened) regulation, not antitrust, though obviously poor regulation can impose
enormous costs.
Id. at 1-2.
23. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407-08 (2004).
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deficits are particularly acute in cases involving high technology markets
in which products are extraordinarily complex and change rapidly. As
Judge Kollar-Kotelly observed, crafting a remedy in the government's
Microsoft case was like "trying to shoe a galloping horse. 24 The record
in such a case describes conduct that occurred well before the case was
filed and that events may have rendered irrelevant by the time any reme-
dial order is entered.25 These considerations make it even more important
to limit intervention to narrowly focused orders.
Remedies in the Microsoft litigation have generally recognized these
concerns. Microsoft was held to have monopolized the market for PC
operating systems through a variety of tactics that impeded the possible
development of Netscape's web browser and Sun Microsystems' Java
technologies into platforms that might have eroded Microsoft's domi-
nance. 6 For the purposes of this Article, we assume those holdings to be
22
correct. 7 They have stimulated follow-on private lawsuits that have
ended in settlements totaling billions of dollars.28 Much of the debate
over injunctive relief during the trial of the government case focused on
whether Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson should break Microsoft up.29
Although he did order Microsoft divided into an applications company
and an operating systems company,0 the court of appeals reversed the
order and strongly suggested that the liability holdings that had survived
appellate review did not justify divestiture.' The plaintiffs abandoned
their request for dissolution and Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly later de-
termined that no form of divestiture was appropriate.32 The final
judgments that Judge Kollar-Kotelly is now administering impose only
conduct orders, most of which sensibly proscribe specific conduct that
the court of appeals found violated the antitrust laws. The remedy does
not even address a few of the illegal actions because no further orders
were thought necessary to prevent Microsoft from repeating them.
24. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F Supp. 2d at 184.
25. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter D.C.
Cir 2001].
26. Id. at 49 (noting that the six years since the conduct at issue in the case began
"seems like an eternity in the computer industry," and that "[b]y the time a court can assess
liability, firms, products, and the marketplace are likely to have changed dramatically").
27. But see, e.g., PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 1, at 167-202 (questioning the holding
that Microsoft's integration of the browser with the Windows operating system was monopo-
listic).
28. Id. at 203-42.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter
D.D.C. Jackson Remedy 2000].
31. D.C. Cir. 2001, 253 F3d at 105-07.
32. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 177-78.
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In some instances, however, the final judgments impose conduct
measures that are, at most, only indirectly responsive to proven monopo-
listic acts. For example, the decree applies to "middleware," a category
that includes more software than the browser and Java technologies that
formed the core of the government's case.33 Other provisions of the final
judgments that the court characterized as "forward-looking" are even
more tenuously linked to proven monopolistic conduct. Of these, the
"'most forward-looking"34 and most problematic in terms of the principles
of antitrust relief is the requirement that Microsoft "make available" its
proprietary communications protocols that permit Windows servers to
interoperate with Windows client computers." These technologies had
almost nothing to do with the government's case, and there was no hold-
ing that Microsoft had manipulated them for exclusionary purposes.
Even though the court of appeals affirmed this provision, it recognized
"the difficulties inherent in crafting a forward-looking provision con-
cerning a type of business conduct as to which there has not been a
violation of the law."36 When a court tries to close "'untraveled roads'
'37
to monopolization, it risks "prevent[ing] the defendant from forging new
routes to serve consumers."38 In expressing these misgivings, the court
was prescient.
The protocol licensing requirement is meant to provide software de-
velopers with the information they need to ensure that applications they
design to run on non-Microsoft servers can interoperate with Microsoft
client computers. This superficially obscure and technical provision has
proven by far the most difficult and costly part of the final judgments to
enforce. Nevertheless, Judge Kollar-Kotelly has placed unusual emphasis
on making the provision succeed. She has reasoned that the provision
assures that the final judgments will have continuing relevance as the
market evolves toward network computing. The provision, she found,
"acknowledges the continuing change in the industry and expands ap-
propriately from the imposition of liability" to assure that "the core of
the decree [will not] prove prematurely obsolete."'3 9
Yet the provision has not succeeded in actually opening up the PC
operating system market to greater competition. Despite Herculean--or,
perhaps more accurately, Sisyphean--efforts by both regulators and
33. Consent Decree, supra note 1, §§ VI.J, VIK, & VI.N.
34. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
35. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § III.E.
36. Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1223 (D.C. Cir.2004) [hereinafter
D.C. Cir 2004 Remedy].
37. Id. (quoting Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947)).
38. Id. at 1224.
39. D. D.C. Tunney Act 2002, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
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Microsoft, which we detail below, few firms have become licensees un-
der the program, and fewer still have developed products that rely on the
protocols. None of the products developed as a result of the program
shows any prospect of becoming a platform that could rival the Windows
desktop. The failure of the program holds important lessons for future
courts in shaping remedies for single-firm monopolization in high tech-
nology markets.
We begin our analysis by briefly describing the liability holdings and
the ensuing remedial proceedings in the Microsoft litigation. In the proc-
ess, we provide an overview of the final judgments and the reasoning the
courts offered for upholding them and rejecting any broader relief. We
then narrow our focus to the communications protocol licensing provi-
sion, explaining its history, requirements, rationale, and mechanism of
enforcement. We then analyze the administration of the program from its
inception in 2003 to the most recent joint status report. In the final part,
we argue that the program has failed because it violates basic principles
of remedial design and implementation in monopolization cases.
II. THE LIABILITY HOLDINGS AND FINAL JUDGMENTS
In May 1998, the United States and nineteen states sued Microsoft,
alleging that it had monopolized the market for PC operating systems by
binding its Internet Explorer web browser to the Windows operating sys-
tem and by forming exclusive contracts with computer manufacturers,
software developers, and firms that provide Internet access and content. °
The trial ran from October 1998 to June 1999. In November 1999, Judge
Thomas Penfield Jackson issued findings of fact4' that accepted the gov-
ernment's account of Microsoft's conduct. Judge Jackson found that
Microsoft had a monopoly in the market for PC operating systems42 that
was protected by network effects, which he termed the "applications bar-
rier to entry.' 43 As an operating system gains new users, Judge Jackson
reasoned, its existing users benefit because developers will have an in-
centive to write more application programs that rely on the operating
40. Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. May 18, 1998),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm; New York v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 98- 1233 (D.D.C. May 18, 1998). The state and federal suits were filed separately, and
later consolidated, D.C. Cir 2001, 253 F.3d at 47, but diverged again in the remedies phase.
D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
41. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 E Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter
D.D.C. Findings 1999].
42. Id. at 15-19 (defining the relevant market and calculating Microsoft's market share
above ninety percent).
43. Id. at 18-24. For discussion of issues of market definition in the case, see PAGE &
LOPATKA, supra note I, 115-65.
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system's programming interfaces, or APIs." The growth in the number of
applications spurs more users to choose the operating system. This "vi-
cious cycle ' 5 protects Microsoft as the dominant supplier because many
users will not switch from Windows simply because there are so many
applications-70,000, according to Judge Jackson-that are compatible
only with Windows. Some applications, however, like Netscape's web
browser and Sun Microsystems' Java technologies, were "middleware"
because they exposed their own APIs. They posed a "middleware threat"
to the Windows monopoly because one or both of them may have
evolved into a rival platform for applications Because such a platform
might allow developers to write applications that would run on any oper-
ating system, it could weaken the applications barrier to entry protecting
Windows.
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft embarked on a broad campaign
to crush the middleware threat. It first offered to divide the browser mar-
ket with Netscape, but when Netscape spurned the offer, it withheld
valuable technical information. It then used a variety of contractual and
design measures to exclude Netscape's browser from the most efficient
distribution channels to prevent Netscape from gaining a sufficient usage
share to succeed as an alternative platform.48 Microsoft also took steps to
prevent adoption of Sun's cross-platform Java, including developing its
own Windows-specific version of Java, and tricking developers into writ-
.49
ing programs in that version. In an important passage, however, Judge
Jackson found that there was "insufficient evidence to find that, absent
Microsoft's actions, Navigator and Java already would have ignited
genuine competition" in the operating systems market, although "Micro-
soft has retarded, and perhaps altogether extinguished, the process by
which these two middleware technologies could have facilitated the in-
troduction of competition into an important market."5°
44. An API is an interface that permits developers to provide convenient access to stan-
dard, low-level system functions. For example, a developer that wanted to implement a "File
Open" dialog in its application, could program all the discrete components of putting the dia-
log on the computer screen, including writing to the video buffers directly on a bit-by-bit
basis. Alternatively, the developer could call a simple Windows API that performs the entire
function. Using the API saves substantial development time and gives the developer's software
the same look and feel of other Windows applications. Microsoft provides thousands of APIs
for developers, including APIs for network interoperability. For an overview of the Windows
API on the MSDN site, see Microsoft Developer Network, http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-
uslibrary/Aa383723.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2007).
45. D.D.C. Findings 1999, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
46. Id. at 28-30.
47. Id. at 30-33.
48. Id. at 46-105.
49. D.D.C. Findings 1999, 84 E Supp. 2d at 105-10.
50. Id. at 111-12.
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After intensive settlement negotiations mediated by Judge Richard
Posner failed in April 2000,' Judge Jackson held that Microsoft had at-
tempted to monopolize the browser market by its offer to divide the
browser market," and had unlawfully maintained its monopoly of PC
operating systems by its various contractual and design measures aimed
at Netscape's browser and Java.53 Shortly thereafter, he ordered Micro-
soft broken up into an applications company and an operating systems
company and imposed extensive conduct restrictions, including a proto-
col licensing requirement."
In June 2001, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously
affirmed many of Judge Jackson's holdings, but reversed others. The
court held that the binding of Internet Explorer and Windows by various
contractual and design measures,55 along with exclusive contracts with
other firms,56 were monopolistic because they threatened to prevent Net-
scape's browser from achieving the critical mass necessary to evolve into
a rival platform. The court also condemned Microsoft's efforts to hinder
Java by, among other things, deceiving developers into using a Windows-
specific version of Java rather than a cross-platform version. 7 Crucially,
however, the court reversed the holdings that Microsoft had monopolized
by offering better products or services at low prices-for example by
developing an Windows-specific version of Java-noting that "a mo-
nopolist does not violate the antitrust laws simply by developing a
product that is incompatible with those of its rivals."5' The court also re-
versed the holding that Microsoft had attempted to monopolize the
market for browsers by offering to divide that market with Netscape.
This reversal mooted the finding that Microsoft had withheld valuable
technical information from its rival.59 Nothing in the opinion supports the
proposition that a monopolist has a general obligation to make its prod-
ucts compatible with those of its rivals or to help its rivals develop
products that can interoperate with its own.
In affirming the liability rulings, the court acknowledged that the
evidence did not establish that Netscape or Java would actually have
evolved into a rival platform absent Microsoft's actions60 Despite this
51. See KEN AULETTA, WORLD WAR 3.0: MICROSOFr AND ITS ENEMIES 340-62 (2001).
52. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2000) [herein-
after D.D.C. Conclusions 2000].
53. Id. at 35-45.
54. D.D.C. Jackson Remedy 2000, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
55. D.C. Cir 2001, 253 F.3d at 60-64, 67-74.
56. Id. at 64-67.
57. Id. at 74-78.
58. Id. at 75.
59. Id. at 80-81.
60. D.C. Cir 2001, 253 F.3d at 78.
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gap in the evidence, the court found it sufficient that Microsoft had
harmed "nascent" rivals by conduct that had no procompetitive justifica-
tion.6' But the court stressed that dearth of causation evidence did matter
on the issue of "whether the court should impose a structural remedy or
merely enjoin the offensive conduct at issue. 62 It reversed the entire re-
medial order,63 and remanded the case to a different judge6 for further
proceedings on the remedy.65
In November 2001, the United States and nine states,66 later called
the New York Group, reached a settlement with Microsoft and proposed
a consent judgment,67 which Judge Kollar-Kotelly reviewed under the
Tunney Act to determine if it was in the public interest.68 Other states,
later called the California Group, pursued more extensive relief in their
pending action, 69 which Judge Kollar-Kotelly evaluated in an evidentiary
hearing that paralleled the Tunney Act proceeding. In both proceedings,
Judge Kollar-Kotelly followed the instructions of the court of appeals
that the "remedy imposed should be carefully 'tailored to fit the wrong
creating the occasion for the remedy.' ' 70 She weighed the remedy against
the evidence that the conduct actually caused a reduction in competition.
Neither side's expert in the remedial phase offered new evidence that
would change the court's assessment of the proof of causation. Conse
quently, Judge Kollar-Kotelly upheld the consent decree in November
2002 with only a minor modification" and limited the nonsettling states
to essentially the same relief.73 (We will refer to the United States' and
settling states' judgment as the "consent decree" and to the nonsettling
states' judgment as the "states' judgment" respectively. We will refer to
61. Id. at 79.
62. Id. at 80.
63. Id. at 98.
64. Id. at 105-07.
65. D.C. Cir 2001, 253 F.3d at 116-17.
66. Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, and Wisconsin. Competitive Impact Statement at 8, United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
Div. No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9500/
9549.pdf.
67. The United States and Microsoft submitted a proposed final judgment on November
2, 2001. After further mediation, the United States and the settling states submitted a slightly
revised proposed final judgment on November 6, 2001. Id. at 9 n. 2.
68. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002).
69. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002).
70. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 97 (quoting D.C. Circuit 2001, 253
F.3d at 107).
71. Id. at 149-51.
72. The court insisted that the decree provide that the court would "retain jurisdiction to
take action sua sponte in conjunction with the enforcement of the decree." D.D.C. Tunney Act
2002, 231 F Supp. 2d at 202.
73. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F Supp. 2d at 266-77. The court rejected the
broad definition of middleware advocated by the nonsettling states.
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them collectively as the "final judgments.") In June 2004, the court of
appeals affirmed both final judgments.14 Judge Kollar-Kotelly is cur-
rently supervising their enforcement.
In keeping with the court of appeals' instruction to impose relief
closely tailored to the liability holdings, the final judgments address
most, but not all, of the conduct found illegal. The prohibitions and
mandates apply to a class of middleware broader than the browser and
Java, which were the subject of the case." "Microsoft Middleware Prod-
uct," for example, is defined to include "Internet Explorer, Microsoft's
Java Virtual Machine, Windows Media Player, Windows Messenger,
Outlook Express and their successors. 7 6 Judge Kollar-Kotelly rejected
the nonsettling states' proposals to expand this definition to include es-
sentially all code that exposes an API.
The remedial provisions apply to both the design of the operating
system in its relationship to middleware and to contractual terms affect-
ing the development and distribution of middleware. Microsoft, for
example, was found to have monopolized by limiting the ability of
OEMs to remove means of access to Internet Explorer and to alter Win-
dows' initial boot sequence to promote rival products. The decree
addresses these concerns by requiring Microsoft to provide utilities in
Windows that give computer manufacturers and users the flexibility to
enable or delete various means of access to Microsoft middleware prod-
ucts77 and to designate non-Microsoft middleware to launch in place of
Microsoft middleware,7  except in limited circumstances. 9 Microsoft
must also permit OEMs, within some limits, to install icons and other
means of launching non-Microsoft middleware.80
74. Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1224, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy].
75. Non-Microsoft Middleware includes products that serve as platforms that allow
applications to run on more than one operating system. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § VI.M.
Non-Microsoft Middleware Products are widely distributed and thus have more platform po-
tential. Id. § VI.N. Microsoft Middleware Products are IE, Microsoft's JVM, Media Player,
Messenger, Outlook Express, and comparable future technologies. Id. § VI.K. Microsoft Mid-
dleware covers the code of middleware products that are separately distributed and
trademarked. Id. § VI.J.
76. Id. § VI.K.
77. Id. § III.H. 1. The mechanisms must provide separate and unbiased choices in these
actions.
78. The invocation must be in a "separate Top-Level Window" and display either the
full interface or the MMP trademark.
79. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § III.H.2.
80. Id. § 1I.C. The states' judgment requires Microsoft to allow OEMs to configure the
initial boot sequence to allow more non-Microsoft middleware to launch and to insert their
own IAP offers, D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F Supp. 2d at 268, without meeting Micro-
soft's technical restrictions, id.
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In response to the holdings that Microsoft formed contracts with
Internet access providers and software developers that gave preference to
Internet Explorer over Navigator, the decree forbids Microsoft from pay-
ing software developers not to distribute rival middleware, except in
limited instances.8' Microsoft may not pay firms to use its platform soft-
ware exclusively or in a fixed proportion.82 In response to the holdings
that Microsoft punished firms using its rivals' products, 3 the final judg-
ments forbid retaliation (or, in the states' judgment, threats of
retaliation ' ) against OEMs for installing rival middleware or operating
systems," although Microsoft may enforce its intellectual property rights
86and may pay OEMs market development fees for distribution services.
Microsoft also must license Windows to all for a single royalty, with lim-
87ited exceptions.
Not all of the conduct the courts held unlawful warranted a corre-
sponding remedial order. The courts had held, for example, that
Microsoft tricked software developers into using Windows-specific di-
rectives in its Java development tools, thus leading them unwittingly to
write programs that would run only on Windows. No remedial provision
responds directly to this conduct, because there was no evidence the
conduct was continuing or likely to be repeated.88 Moreover, despite the
holding that Microsoft unlawfully "commingled" browsing code with
operating system code, the final judgments do not require Microsoft to
allow removal of the code that supported the relevant functionality, only
the visible means of invoking that functionality.89
Although the provisions we have just described apply to a wider
range of products than those at issue in the government case, they are
narrowly tailored to the conduct actually found unlawful. Some provi-
sions, however, impose obligations that have no direct connection to
illegal conduct. These provisions were thought necessary "to foster com-
petition in the monopolized market in a manner consistent with the
theory of liability in this case" 9 by assuring interoperability. One of
these provisions requires Microsoft to disclose "APIs used by Microsoft
81. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § III.F.2. These requirements do not prohibit Micro-
soft from enforcing an IP right that is consistent with the judgment.
82. Id. § IH.G.1.
83. These included Microsoft's threat to Intel that it would favor AMD technologies if
Intel aided Sun in developing Java, and its threat to Apple that it would drop MacOffice if
Apple did not give preferential placement to IE in the MacOS.
84. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 163-68.
85. Id. at 267.
86. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § III.A.
87. Id. § III.B.
88. D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F.3d at 1213-15.
89. Id. at 1210.
90. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
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Middleware to interoperate with a Windows Operating System Prod-
uct."9' Disclosure of these APIs was thought necessary to place rival
middleware suppliers on an equal footing with Microsoft in writing
Windows applications.
The decree's "most forward-looking provision," however, is § III.E,
which requires Microsoft to
make available for use by third parties, for the sole purpose of in-
ter-operating or communicating with a Windows Operating
System Product, on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms ....
any Communications Protocol that is ... (i) implemented in a
Windows Operating System Product installed on a client com-
puter, and (ii) used to interoperate, or communicate, natively (i.e.,
without the addition of software code to the client operating sys-
tem product) with a Microsoft server operating system product.92
This provision is the basis for the protocol licensing program that we
examine in Part IV. But first, we have to unearth the rationale for such a
unique requirement.
III. THE PROTOCOL LICENSING REQUIREMENT
As we saw in the last Part, the protocol licensing requirement differs
from other provisions of the final judgment in that it does not respond
directly to any illegal conduct. Nevertheless, Judge Kollar-Kotelly was
able to approve the requirement as sufficiently linked to the broader the-
ory of the case. In this section, we briefly describe network computing
and the role of communication protocols in its processes. We then show
that the government first proposed measures aimed at assuring interop-
erability during the initial unsuccessful settlement negotiations and
incorporated similar measures in its proposed remedy, which Judge
Jackson entered without change. After the reversal of that order, the De-
91. Id. at 268. The district court rejected proposals for more sweeping disclosures, id. at
173-77, and the court of appeals affirmed, D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F.3d at 1244.
92. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § III.E. "Communications Protocol" was defined as
"the set of rules for information exchange to accomplish predefined tasks between a Windows
Operating System Product and a server operating system product connected via a network,
including, but not limited to, a local area network, a wide area network or the Intemet. These
rules govern the format, semantics, timing, sequencing, and error control of messages ex-
changed over a network." Id. § VI.B. Thus, the "definition includes both the rules for
information exchange and transmittal ('format, timing, sequencing and error control') as well
as the meaning of the information contained within the protocol ('semantics')." Response of
the United States to Public Comments on the Revised Proposed Final Judgment, 328, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Feb. 27, 2002) [hereinafter CIS
Response], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/flO100/1 0145.pdf.
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partment of Justice and Microsoft agreed to include a protocol licensing
provision-what we call limited disclosure-in the consent decree. The
nonsettling states, however, pursued what we call comprehensive disclo-
sure. In the final section, we show that Judge Kollar-Kotelly rejected any
requirement of comprehensive disclosure as inconsistent with the theory
and holding of liability in the case, but endorsed the requirement of lim-
ited disclosure. That requirement has led to the creation of the
communications protocol licensing program.
A. Networks and Communications Protocols
Microsoft rose to dominance in a market in which most personal
computers exclusively ran their own operating systems and applications.
Increasingly, however, personal computers have been linked as clients in
networks managed by a set of server computers that perform centralized
tasks. Server operating systems execute server-based applications for the
client computers.93 Communications protocols are the "rules for the
transmission of information between '9 4 the servers and clients, and be-
tween servers and other servers. The protocols provide the form and
content of a language used by computers on a network to accomplish the
myriad tasks that make up normal network communications. Like dip-
lomatic protocols, communications protocols on a network are part of a
complex and interdependent set of challenges and responses.
During the process of booting, a computer listens to a hardware port
for communications protocols, in this instance, the packets of data that
indicate that the computer is connected to a network. If it discovers an
active network, the computer sends a packet of its own to a server. If the
server recognizes the packet, it initiates a dialogue that results in a con-
nection between the client computer and the server for the current
session. Although the names of protocols may seem alien to non-
technical readers, recognizable user-level events like printing to a net-
work printer, saving a file on a network drive, sending an email, and
viewing a web page, are entirely made up of, and enabled by, the build-
ing blocks of discrete communications protocols. In executing these
functions, a user's workstation and the servers will exchange millions of
occurrences of thousands of types of communications protocols.
When client and server computers exchange and use information
through protocols they interoperate. As Judge Kollar-Kotelly recog-
nized, however, interoperability is a matter of degree. If all of the clients
and servers on a network are part of the same "hardware-software plat-
form family," they can interoperate relatively easily and fully because
93. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 121.
94. Id. at 233.
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they share "a common base of code."95 The client operating systems in
this kind of homogeneous network will typically include native software
that permits interoperation with the servers.96 Most networks, however,
are heterogeneous in that most of the client computers run a version of
Windows, while the servers run operating systems from a variety of
vendors, including Microsoft. 97 In these networks, the server operating
systems have different code bases and different ways of accomplishing
functions like storing files and tracking their characteristics.98 A client
may nevertheless interoperate with different types of servers by relying
on shared communications protocols.99 Some communications protocols
are standard in the industry.' °° Firms may, however, formulate protocols
specific to their needs, in some cases by adding proprietary extensions to
standard protocols. Microsoft has added extensions to some standard
protocols that allow Windows clients to interact differently with Micro-
soft servers than with other servers. Some protocols are built into
Windows and thus allow "native" interoperation. These include standard
Internet protocols, like TCP/IP, HTTP, and FTP,'°' among many others.
Others can be added either to Windows or to the server operating sys-
tem."
Developers can also achieve interoperation by adding software to the
Windows client.10 3 Microsoft provides developers with a rich set of APIs
that the developers can use to achieve interoperability with Windows
networking products. By using the existing APIs, developers can focus
on adding functionality to their products, without having to understand
low-level protocols. Novell's NetWare,'04 for example, competes with
Microsoft's Windows server products and also interoperates with Micro-
soft clients and servers. In order to provide networking services to
Windows clients, Novell provides software that runs on Windows and
95. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F Supp. 2d at 122.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 121-22.
98. Id. at 122.
99. Id. at 122-23.
100. Microsoft has stated that most of the protocols are (1) within the TCP/IP stack, and
(2) are proprietary additions to or extensions of existing industry-standard protocols. See Mi-
crosoft Developer's Network (MSDN), Interoperation Using MCPP Non-RPC Protocols,
available at http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms817901.aspx (last visited Oct. 4,
2007).
101. D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F.3d at 1222, n. 15.
102. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 122-23, 234.
103. See Direct Testimony of Stuart E. Madnick, fi 76-85, New York v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 98-1233 (CKK) (D.D.C. submitted Apr. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Madnick Direct],
available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/downloadlegalURemediesTrial/madnick.pdf.
104. See Novell NetWare Product Page, http://www.novell.com/products/netware (last
visited Oct. 16, 2007).
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emulates the existing Microsoft software using the publicly available
Windows API rather than any disclosed protocol.' 5 The Novell network
client software actually offers users more features than the comparable
Windows tools.' °6 It would have been far more costly and needlessly du-
plicative for Novell to achieve the same functionality using disclosed
protocols directly and foregoing reliance on the Windows API. Although
one might think Microsoft would have an incentive to manipulate APIs
to disadvantage a direct competitor like Novell,' 7 it could not do so
without denying noncompetitive developers access to the same re-
sources, 0 8 thus undermining the value of the Windows platform.' °9
B. Origins of the Protocol Licensing Requirement
The Microsoft case did not hold that Microsoft violated the antitrust
laws by making Windows incompatible with other products." Micro-
soft's rivals, however, have long alleged that Microsoft preserved and
extended its monopoly by manipulating its operating system interfaces in
discriminatory ways, so that rival applications would appear to be in-
compatible with Microsoft operating systems. The oft-spoken (if
implausible) claim, years ago, was that "DOS isn't done until Lotus
[1-2-3, then the dominant spreadsheet application] won't run.""' Similar
concerns entered the thinking of the parties to the Microsoft case early
and became paramount during settlement negotiations, even though the
notion that Microsoft would deliberately sabotage its own API was in
some tension with the court's finding that the Windows API supports
70,000 applications."'
105. Examples of the client software would be software that achieves connection with
servers, handles network print jobs, allows a user to set properties of files and folders, etc.
106. For example, a Windows user can select a folder on a Windows server network
drive, right-click, and choose "properties." One option shown will allow the folder to be
"compressed." Under NetWare, however, the user has several options regarding compression
of folders, reflecting the extended functionality that NetWare offers over the competitive Win-
dows server product. Madnick Direct, supra note 103, 82.
107. Id. 185.
108. Id.
109. Essentially, developers create the demand for Windows products by writing applica-
tions that run on the Windows platform. Without developers, the business case for acquiring
Windows relative to competitive products is greatly diminished.
110. D.C. Cir 2001, 253 F.3d at 75.
111. For an interesting investigation of this assertion and its origins, albeit by a Micro-
soft employee, see Adam Barr, DOS Ain't Done til Lotus Won't Run? (Aug. 1, 2005),
http://www.proudlyserving.com/archives/2005/08/dos aint-done_t.html. Cf ANDREW
SCHULMAN, ET AL., UNDOCUMENTED WINDOWS: A PROGRAMMERS GUIDE TO RESERVED MI-
CROSOFt WINDOWS API FUNCTIONS (1992).
112. D.C. Cir. 2001, 253 F.3d at 55.
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1. The Netscape White Paper
In 1996, Gary Reback and Susan Creighton, then attorneys for Net-
scape, submitted to the government a lengthy White Paper outlining a
theory for a government antitrust action against Microsoft."3 This docu-
ment was the first to assert that Netscape" 4 and Java"5 posed a platform
threat to the Windows monopoly, and to describe various measures Mi-
crosoft had directed at Netscape, including bundling of the browser and
the operating system and predatory pricing.
Among its many claims, Netscape alleged that Microsoft had "sabo-
tage[d]" Netscape's ability to innovate "with its manipulation of the
disclosure of program interfaces-interfaces already shown to Micro-
soft's own engineers, and incorporated into its own products." 6 The
White Paper continued:
Every day that a[] [Netscape] engineer wastes trying to work
around Microsoft's stonewalling, or implementing an alternative
solution to what Microsoft already has in place, or tearing down
a solution that Microsoft effectively renders inoperable-that is
a day when the engineer is not innovating, not pushing the enve-
lope of product performance, not developing features desired by
consumers. It is pure social waste: it is a monopolist saying, "I
have the combination that will unlock the safe; see if you can
figure out what it is."'' 7
The White Paper offered several instances of this tactic, including the
withholding of key technical information from Netscape in the months
prior to the release of Windows 95. "8 It also alleged that Microsoft had
sought to encourage developers to use its own version of Java technolo-
gies rather than Sun's cross-platform version." 9 Versions of these claims
would later appear in the government's 1998 case,' 20 although they were
never found to be illegal themselves.
113. Gary Reback & Susan Creighton, White Paper Regarding Recent Anticompetitive
Conduct of Microsoft Corporation (July 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
114. Id. at 48-51.
115. Id. at 88-91.
116. Id. at 117.
117. Id. at 118.
118. Id. at 120-24.
119. Id. at 91.
120. Direct Testimony of Jim Barksdale, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(D.D.C. May 18, 1998), 106 ("[W]e needed the Remote Network Access ("RNA") phone-
book API from Microsoft. We also needed other technical information from Microsoft,
including a scripting engine in beta, and the most recent version of Windows 95."); id. 114
("Interestingly, we did not receive the APIs and other technical information we had been seek-
ing until October 1995--or approximately three months later, which was well after the launch
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The White Paper also suggested that Microsoft's long-term goal was
121to dominate "the enterprise," that is, business networks or intranets.
Netscape argued that Microsoft intended to leverage its monopoly of the
desktop to gain control of the server operating systems that coordinate
business computing. Novell historically "dominated" the file and print
sharing functions of business networks with its NetWare product, while
(usually separate) Unix servers ran applications like databases and
email.'22 Microsoft, however, had begun to "dominate both markets" with
Windows NT servers by exploiting its control of the dominant client op-
erating systems.12 From this base, Microsoft's goal was to "dominate the
next layer up-server applications," by promoting the integration of Mi-
crosoft's server applications with the operating system.124
The White Paper suggested that Microsoft feared Netscape would
thwart its plans to dominate network computing. Netscape's model
placed a browser on the client computer and a web server on the server
operating system, an arrangement that allowed server-based applications
to communicate with client operating systems through the browser, using
the standard HTML language. 2- This arrangement threatened Microsoft,
because "all of the Web server applications may be written using an OS-
independent Web server API, instead of making calls directly to server
operating systems such as Microsoft's Windows NT Server or Unix.' 26
This arrangement allowed Netscape's server-based applications to inter-
operate with any other application "that supports open protocols"',
27
Microsoft, according to the White Paper, had sought to undermine this
strategy by attempting to supplant standard protocols with proprietary
ones. These allegations did not appear in the government case, although
they (or others like them) may have influenced the European case
against Microsoft.
2. The Litigation, the First Settlement Negotiations,
and Judge Jackson's Remedy
The government's case alleged that Microsoft monopolized the mar-
ket for client operating systems by its actions against middleware, a
of Windows 95 and was precisely what Microsoft had threatened at the June 21 meeting."),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1900/1999.pdf.
121. Reback & Creighton, supra note 113, at 41-47.
122. Id. at 44-45.
123. Id. at 45.
124. Id. at 46-47.
125. Id. at 56. Cf Madnick Direct, supra note 103, 70 ("Many companies are turning
to Web-type interfaces to achieve interoperability, both over the Internet and on internal or-
ganization networks.").
126. Reback & Creighton, supra note 113, at 58.
127. Id.
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"nascent" platform. It did not focus on server operating systems or the
programs that run on them. Judge Jackson did recognize that a client
computer could access applications running on server operating systems,
including ones hosted on web sites, 28 and speculated that "the growth of
server- and middleware-based applications development might eventu-
ally weaken the applications barrier to entry" and thus allow rivals to
"present a viable alternative to Windows."'29 Nevertheless, he found that
it was "not clear whether ISVs will ever develop a large, diverse body of
full-featured applications that rely solely on APIs exposed by servers and
middleware."'3 (Interestingly, eight years later, web service applications
are beginning to appear, all of which are cross-platform and run well in
most browsers.) 3' Consequently, he concluded, server operating systems
were not in the PC operating system market because they did not yet
prevent Microsoft from exercising monopoly power. The D.C. Circuit
affirmed this conclusion.
32
Judge Jackson also found that Microsoft at least considered the pos-
sibility of gaining control of the Internet protocols that are the basis of
web browsing. He held, for example, that had Netscape accepted the
1995 market-division proposal, Microsoft would have had a sufficient
lead in browser development to "add[] proprietary extensions to the
browsing software under its control and ... extract[] commitments
from" computer and Internet firms to use those extensions. 33 He found
that:
Although the suspicion lingers, the evidence is insufficient to
find that Microsoft's ambition is a future in which most or all of
the content available on the Web would be accessible only
through its own browsing software. The evidence does, however,
reveal an intent to ensure that if and when full-featured, server-
based applications begin appearing in large numbers on the Web,
the number of them relying solely on middleware APIs (such as
128. D.D.C. Findings 1999, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 16; see also id. at 17 ("As the bandwidth
available to the average user increases, 'portal' Web sites, which aggregate Web content and
provide services such as search engines, E-mail, and travel reservation systems, could begin to
host full lines of the server-based, personal-productivity applications that have begun to ap-
pear in small numbers on the Web.").
129. Id. at25.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Google Docs and Spreadsheets, http://www.google.corlgoogle-d-
s/bl.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2007); Zoho Office Suite Home Page, http://www.zoho.com
(last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
132. D.C. Cir. 2001, 253 F.3d at 52.
133. D.D.C. Conclusions 2000, 87 F. Supp. 2d 46.
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those exposed by Navigator) will be too few to attenuate the ap-
plications barrier to entry.1
3 4
Server operating systems and applications based on them did not figure
in Judge Jackson's liability holdings or in the D.C. Circuit's review of
them.
Why, given the marginal role of server operating systems and appli-
cations in the litigation, do these products figure so prominently in the
remedy? The idea of requiring Microsoft to disclose protocols for inter-
operation of server-based applications and Windows seems to have
arisen during the settlement negotiations mediated by Judge Posner be-
tween January and March of 2000, long after the record in the liability
phase of the case had closed. According to Ken Auletta's fascinating ac-
count,135 the negotiations did not focus on the same conduct as the
findings of fact because no one thought Microsoft wanted to continue
that specific conduct. The browser wars were essentially over. Microsoft
had already dropped its exclusive contracts and had stopped charging
substantially different prices for Windows to different OEMs.
Consequently, "[t]he central point of contention became whether
Microsoft would share more technical information. The Justice Depart-
ment, which had been canvassing Microsoft's enemies, had grown ever
more concerned that Microsoft would keep non-Windows operating sys-
tems and non-Office software from interoperating smoothly with
Windows.' 36 On March 2, 2000, Judge Posner circulated the thirteenth
draft of a settlement document and told Microsoft that "Joel Klein [then
the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust] had added a new demand:
Microsoft must disclose to competing software developers the Windows
APIs invoked by Microsoft programs that run on servers, thus assuring
that non-Microsoft software could connect to a Windows PC.' 3 7 The new
demand reflected the government's fear, apparently encouraged by Mi-
crosoft's rivals, "that Microsoft would maintain its dominance by
retarding the ability of non-Microsoft servers-servers being the vital,
digitized, data-filled libraries that served corporate networks and the
Internet-to hook onto PCs powered by Windows.' 38
Posner was reportedly initially "exasperated" by the new demand
and refused to include it in the new draft. Later, however, he suggested to
Microsoft that, if it agreed to the demand, the Justice Department would
settle the case. At this point, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates "decided to
134. D.D.C. Findings 1999, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 104.
135. AULETTA, supra note 51, at 340-62.
136. Id. at 345.
137. Id. at 346.
138. Id.
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surrender" and signed the fourteenth draft.3 9 Many of the states, how-
ever, objected to the new draft, and Klein himself began having
misgivings about some of the technical terminology of the proposed
agreement. He sent Posner a new demand that the disclosures would
have to include not only the APIs that rival server-based applications
would need to connect to a Windows client, but "also the APIs used by
Microsoft's own software applications for servers."' 40 The states wanted
the obligations extended to hand-held devices as well. Enforcement offi-
cials apparently thought Microsoft "had a sinister plan to extend its
empire" because of an email Gates sent in 1999 arguing that Microsoft
needed "to demonstrate to people like Nokia why our PDA will connect
to Office in a better way than other PDAs even if that means changing
how ... we tie some of our audio and video advanced work to only run
on our PDAs"'1
41
This kind of talk led enforcers to believe Microsoft might reprise
something like its Netscape strategy in the network environment: "As the
industry and consumers moved toward network solutions where various
devices talked not just to the PC but to powerful servers on or off the
Internet, Justice reasoned, if non-Windows users couldn't effortlessly
connect with Windows they would be compelled to switch to Windows
products."'1 2 Thus, more disclosures were necessary to "frustrate Micro-
soft's ability to leverage its Windows power into the post-PC world.' 43
The new draft would have required Microsoft to reveal not only APIs but
"communications interfaces" and "technical information" used to allow
Windows servers and clients to interoperate, and could have been inter-
preted to require disclosure of Microsoft's source code.' 4 The draft also
included, for the first time, the creation of a technical committee-
apparently Posner's brainchild-to oversee the enforcement of the
judgment. Microsoft, also concerned about the vagueness of some of the
language in the draft, sought to "allay[] the government's fears concern-
ing interoperability""' 5 by proposing to "reengineer Windows so that all
protocols supported in it would be 'plug replaceable' through interfaces
that were open."' 46
In late March, Microsoft and the Justice Department sent new pro-
posals for the terms of settlement. The primary differences lay in the
139. Id. at 347.
140. AULETTA, supra note 51, at 348.
141. Id. at 349.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 351.
144. Id. at 351-52.
145. AULETTA, supra note 51, at 354.
146. Id.
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measures to assure interoperability. The government's proposal would
have required Microsoft to disclose "technical information and commu-
nications interfaces that Microsoft employs to enable ... a Windows
operating system and middleware distributed with such operating system
installed on one personal computer to interoperate with ... software in-
stalled on a different personal computer or on a server.'', 47 The
government's definition of "technical information" encompassed any-
thing a developer would need to make software running on any device
interoperate with Windows. 4 1 In response, Microsoft submitted a new
draft agreement, but, at that point, a group of state officials submitted a
new list of "preliminary" demands that Posner considered unreasonable.
Posner terminated the mediation.'49
Shortly after the collapse of the settlement negotiations, Judge Jack-
son issued his conclusions of law. He held that Microsoft had
monopolized the market for PC operating systems by its actions aimed at
Netscape and had attempted to monopolize the market for browsers. In
early May, the government submitted its proposal that Microsoft be bro-
ken up and subjected to a variety of conduct restrictions. Both the
breakup proposal and the conduct restrictions reflected the government's
concerns about interoperability. The memorandum in support of the pro-
posed judgment argued that the findings showed Microsoft had withheld
interfaces and technical information strategically to disadvantage com-
petitive middleware.'5 ° In a critical passage, the memorandum suggested
147. Mediator's Draft No. 18 of Settlement Stipulation and Proposed Consent Decree,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232; New York v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1233,
available as Attachment B of ProComp, Comments to the Proposed Final Judgment in United
States v. Microsoft Corporation, § 3(8), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
mstuncom/major/mtc-00030608.pdf.
148. The draft defined technical information as:
all information, regarding the identification and means of using APIs (or communi-
cations interfaces), that competent software developers require to make their
products running on a personal computer, server, or other device interoperate satis-
factorily with Windows platform software running on a personal computer.
Technical information includes reference implementations, communications proto-
cols, file formats, data formats, data structure definitions and layouts, error codes,
memory allocation and deallocation conversions, threading and synchronization
conventions, algorithms for data translation or reformatting (including compres-
sion/decompression algorithms and encryption/decryption algorithms), registry
settings, and field contents.
Id. § 2(11); see also AULErA, supra note 51, at 358.
149. AULETrA, supra note 51, at 360.
150. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment, at 5, 20, United
States v. Microsoft, Civ. No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 28, 2000) ("Microsoft has withheld,
threatened to withhold, and discriminated in the disclosure of the APIs, interfaces, and techni-
cal information required to enable ISVs, IHVs, and OEMs to make their products interoperate
with Windows so that competitive middleware cannot connect to Windows in a timely way, or
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that it would be insufficient simply to enjoin the same conduct held ille-
gal in the case because Microsoft was likely to use the same conduct
against new middleware threats, including ones that did not yet exist:
In crafting an effective Sherman Act remedy, a court must use
the record of a backward-looking trial to fashion forward-
looking relief. Looking forward, the Court must anticipate that
Microsoft, unless restrained by appropriate equitable relief,
likely will continue to perpetuate its monopoly by the same anti-
competitive methods revealed at trial, although directed at
whatever new competitive threat arises. Neither the Netscape
browser nor Java continues to have the prospect of lowering the
applications barrier to entry, and it is not certain where future
threats to Microsoft's operating system will arise.'5'
Despite this uncertainty, the memorandum undertook to identify poten-
tial threats, one of which was middleware running on servers:
As computing continues to move off the desktop and into the
Internet, middleware threats could develop on servers, in either
server operating systems or server applications. Microsoft can-
not defeat these threats by bundling its own version of such
software into its PC operating systems, but it could use its oper-
ating system monopoly in other ways to crush any such
middleware threats. For example, [Windows 2000] is designed
with proprietary features and interfaces that enable Microsoft's
server operating systems to interoperate with PCs more effec-
tively than other server operating systems .... If Microsoft were
in a competitive market, it would disclose its confidential inter-
face information to other server software developers so that their
complementary software would work optimally with, and
thereby enhance the value of, Microsoft's PC operating systems.
But, if faced with a middleware threat on the servers, Microsoft
is likely to continue to withhold that information from competi-
tors in order to protect its operating system monopoly .... 52
Both the government's breakup proposal and some of the conduct
remedies were designed to address this possibility. The vertical divesti-
ture proposed by the government was puzzling at first glance. Unlike
some divestiture proposals, vertical divestiture would have left Micro-
soft's monopoly in the market for PC operating systems intact. The
at all, or so that use of such competitive middleware will be a 'jolting experience' to the
user"), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f219100/219107.pdf.
151. Id. at 27-28.
152. Id. at 29.
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proposed divestiture was responsive, however, to the government's fears
about interoperability. All of those concerns related to Microsoft's per-
ceived incentives to leverage its Windows monopoly in ways that gave it
advantages in downstream markets. If the Windows business were sepa-
rated from the applications business, these concerns would recede
because each of the separated firms would "seek to maximize its own
profits and will have incentives to ensure that its products interoperate
with operating systems and applications produced by others.' 53
In addition to the divestiture order, the government proposed con-
duct restrictions based on the drafts exchanged in the failed settlement
negotiations. The key one for our purposes would have required Micro-
soft to disclose "all APIs, Technical Information and Communications
Interfaces that Microsoft employs to enable" Microsoft software, includ-
ing server operating systems, to interoperate with a Windows client PC
operating system.15'4 The provision would have required Microsoft to give
computer manufacturers and software and hardware vendors access to
Windows source code in order to achieve interoperability.'55 This provi-
sion, the government claimed, would have allowed ISVs "to compete on
a level playing field" by giving them access to "information that Micro-
soft's own developers use" so they "will have a reasonable opportunity
to make their software run as well with Windows as Microsoft's soft-
ware does.' 56 The government (naively, it turns out) added that
"Microsoft already routinely documents and distributes technical infor-
mation, so the provision will not place a significant burden upon it.'
5 7
Despite Microsoft's objections to the government's proposals, Judge
Jackson entered the judgment unchanged, without further proceedings
and essentially without explanation. The court of appeals, however, re-
versed the entire remedy because Judge Jackson had erred in failing
either to conduct a hearing on the remedy or to explain how the remedy
was necessary to restore competition.' 58 The court also noted that be-
cause it had reversed the attempted monopolization and tying claims, it
would be necessary for the district court, on remand, to determine
whether the "equitable remedies were required to rectify a § 2 monopoly
maintenance violation taken alone."'59 The court did not address the sub-
stance of Judge Jackson's remedy, except to suggest that divestiture was
153. Id. at 36.
154. D.D.C. Jackson Remedy 2000, 97 F Supp. 2d at 67.
155. Id.
156. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 150, at
40.
157. Id. at 40-41.
158. D.C. Cir 2001, 253 F.3d at 98.
159. Id. at 104.
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inappropriate where the defendant is a "unitary company" and where the
evidence fails to show "a sufficient causal connection" '6° between the
defendant's unlawful conduct and its dominant position.
C. The Remedial Proceedings after Remand
Three months after the remand, on September 28, 2001, Judge Kol-
lar-Kotelly ordered the parties to attempt to settle the case, imposing a
deadline of October 12, 2001 for unmediated discussions, and another
deadline of November 2, 2001 for any mediated discussions that might
become necessary.' 6' Invoking the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center that had occurred just days before, she warned the parties that she
expected them to "act in good faith and [to] engage in an all-out effort to
settle these cases, meeting seven days a week and around the clock, act-
ing reasonably to reach a fair resolution.' 62 Following these instructions,
and with the assistance of two mediators,' 63 the United States and nine of
the states reached agreement on a proposed final judgment, which was
filed November 6, 2001.' 4 The California group of nonsettling states
pursued their pending case, seeking more extensive relief.
The proposed consent decree was, with a few modifications, the
same as the final judgments Judge Kollar-Kotelly would enter about a
year later in both tracks of the litigation. She rejected the objections to
the consent decree raised in the Tunney Act proceedings, and entered an
essentially identical final judgment.65 In the litigating states' parallel
proceeding, she rejected the states' demands for much broader relief and
approved Microsoft's proposed relief based on the consent decree. 166 The
final judgment in the states' case differed from the consent decree al-
most exclusively in the method provided for enforcement. The
provisions of the two final judgments that require disclosure of commu-
nications protocols differ only in the dates they took effect. Again, the
160. Id. at 106.
161. Order, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2001),
available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/opinions/misc/microsoft/98-1232gg.pdf.
162. Id.
163. Eric D. Green & Jonathan B. Marks, Op-Ed, Mediating Microsoft, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 15, 2001, at A23, available at http://www.resolutionsllc.com/documents/
0111 14%20globe%20final%20cut.pdf.
164. Stipulation and Revised Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f9400/9495.pdf.
165. The only change was in § VII, in which Judge Kollar-Kotelly insisted on retaining
jurisdiction to modify the judgment on her own motion. D.D.C. Tunney Act 2002, 231 F. Supp.
2d at 202.
166. New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002).
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court of appeals in 2004 affirmed the provision and rejected more exten-
sive disclosure requirements. 1
67
1. Rejecting Comprehensive Disclosure
The nonsettling states proposed that Microsoft be required to make a
comprehensive disclosure of, among other things, all interfaces and
technical information that any Microsoft program used to interoperate
with any Microsoft platform software installed on any computing de-
vice. 168 Judge Kollar-Kotelly rejected this much broader disclosure
requirement, observing that it "would require Microsoft to disclose vast
amounts of its intellectual property across product lines unrelated to the
relevant market in this case."169 She rejected the nonsettling states pro-
posal that the licenses be made royalty-free, reasoning that any such
requirement would represent an unjustified "forced divestiture of assets"
and therefore a "structural remedy."''7 0 She also rejected the nonsettling
states' proposed definition of "interoperate," as "the ability of two prod-
ucts to effectively access, utilize, and/or support the full features and
functionality of one another."'' 7 1 Such a definition would have equated
interoperability with interchangeability, and would have permitted, in
effect, the cloning of Windows. Such a result would provide "a windfall
for competitors,"'' 72 but would reduce the value of Microsoft's intellectual
property and undermine its incentive to innovate. 173
The nonsettling states sought to justify comprehensive disclosure by
pointing to both old and new "bad acts" in which Microsoft allegedly
used incompatibilities to gain a competitive advantage. 174 For example,
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft had withheld technical information
that Netscape needed to run properly on Windows 95. 17 Judge Kollar-
Kotelly held, however, that Judge Jackson's findings of fact describing
"bad acts" that were never held illegal, and never "weighed for competi-
tive and anticompetitive effect[,] ... cannot be utilized to justify specific
remedial provisions.' 76 Harm to rivals is lawful unless it also harms the
"competitive process," and thus consumers.177
167. D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F.3d at 1222-25.
168. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
169. Id. at 227.
170. Id. at 236.
171. Id. at 227.
172. Id. at 229.
173. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 229-30.
174. Id. at 143.
175. D.D.C. Findings 1999, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34.
176. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002,224 F. Supp. 2d at 138.
177. Id. at 139.
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New bad acts that the plaintiffs alleged during the remedial phase
were also irrelevant to the remedy unless related to the liability find-
ings. ' The plaintiffs offered testimony that Microsoft had impeded
interoperation in network computing in order to gain a competitive ad-
vantage. The network services affected included authentication,'79 file
and print sharing, 8° directory services, 1"' databases, 1 2 messaging, ' and
communications between server and client computers.'"4 Judge Kollar-
Kotelly concluded that these new bad acts relating to interoperability
178. Id.
179. Kerberos is an open security protocol that authenticates users on a network. In im-
plementing the protocol Microsoft added a proprietary extension that allowed a Kerberos
"ticket" both to authenticate and authorize the user. "As a result, a non-Windows client inter-
operating with a Microsoft server cannot make use of all of the same authorization services as
a Microsoft Windows client interoperating with a Microsoft server," id. at 140, although a
developer could still extend the open protocol for its own implementations. Microsoft had
submitted information about its extension to a standards-setting body, but plaintiffs neverthe-
less complained that Microsoft's action "violated the 'spirit' of the open standard." Id.
Microsoft responded, however, that it did not intend to impede interoperability by its proprie-
tary extensions, but that sometimes it may indirectly do so, because of how it directs its
resources in developing its products. Id. at 143.
180. Microsoft developed SMB, a proprietary protocol for file and print sharing, one
subset of which, called CIFS, allowed secure file access over the Internet and local networks.
Other developers reverse engineered these protocols to create SAMBA, an open-source clone
implementation "that enables non-Microsoft servers to perform file and print sharing functions
with Microsoft server and client operating systems," albeit imperfectly. D.D.C. States Remedy
2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 140-41. The plaintiffs claimed Microsoft's actions impeded interop-
erability; Microsoft stated it would disclose the SMB and CIFS protocols under the consent
decree.
181. Server operating systems must maintain a directory of information about compo-
nents of the network. Client computers can interoperate with directories on different servers
through LDAP, a standard protocol. Microsoft, however, developed ASDI, a proprietary exten-
sion of LDAP that allows Windows clients to interoperate with a variety of directories.
Plaintiffs claimed that this action disadvantaged vendors of other server operating systems in
interoperating with Windows Clients. Microsoft claimed that its protocol was disclosed on the
Microsoft Developers Network. Id. at 141-42.
182. Microsoft's relational database application, SQL Server, relies on Microsoft's pro-
prietary TDS protocol to communicate with Windows clients. It allows Office programs, for
example, to access data on SQL server. Although TDS has been reverse-engineered, the plain-
tiffs' witness alleged that, without disclosure of TDS, Linux clients and servers are
disadvantaged in a SQL server network. Id. at 142.
183. Microsoft developed the MAPI protocol, which has become the industry standard
for server-based messaging. After MAPI was adopted, Microsoft added proprietary extensions
that allow Microsoft servers to communicate with Microsoft Outlook clients in ways that non-
Microsoft servers cannot. The plaintiffs' witnesses asserted that the proprietary extensions
were designed to create incompatibility. Microsoft claimed they were innovations to make
their products work better than others. Id.
184. Windows relies on MUP to regulate communications between clients and servers.
When Microsoft revised MUP for one update of Windows NT in 1996, it slowed requests for
information on Novell servers-a result that Novell contended was intentional and not reme-
died quickly enough. Microsoft denied this, and noted that the problem had been resolved. Id.
at 142-43.
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were only remotely connected to the liability holdings and therefore
should play little if any role in shaping the remedy.8 - They were not
linked to Microsoft's actions that led developers unwittingly to use a
Windows-specific version of the Java technologies, because liability in
that instance was limited to the deception itself. The court of appeals had
specifically upheld Microsoft's development of an incompatible, but
faster version of Java. 8 6 It followed that "a monopolist's decision to alter
industry standards or implement a proprietary version of such standards




Similarly, the bad acts were not related to the holding that Microsoft
had provided valuable technical information to software developers in
return for their agreement to promote Internet Explorer and the Micro-
soft Java technologies exclusively. The court of appeals emphasized that
providing technical information as an inducement was lawful. What was
unlawful was the exaction of the agreement to develop Microsoft's prod-
ucts exclusively.8 The new bad acts were somewhat more closely
related to the old bad acts described in Judge Jackson's findings of fact,
but that linkage was irrelevant because the old bad acts were not them-
selves illegal. Merely withholding "proprietary technical information
unrelated to any exclusive deals" was not a continuation of conduct held
illegal. 89
2. Approving Limited Disclosure
Although Judge Kollar-Kotelly refused to order Microsoft to under-
take the sort of comprehensive disclosure the nonsettling states
demanded, she approved the consent decree's requirement of limited
disclosure. This required the licensing of communications protocols im-
plemented in Windows client operating systems to allow native
interoperation with Microsoft server operating systems.' 9° She also ap-
proved Microsoft's proposal for the same relief in the nonsettling states'
185. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F Supp. 2d at 144.
186. Id. at 144-45.
187. Id. at 145.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 146.
190. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 129; Consent Decree, supra note 1,
§ IHI.E. "Communications Protocol" was defined as "the set of rules for information exchange
to accomplish predefined tasks between a Windows Operating System Product and a server
operating system product connected via a network, including, but not limited to, a local area
network, a wide area network or the Internet. These rules govern the format, semantics, tim-
ing, sequencing, and error control of messages exchanged over a network." Id. § VI.B. Thus,
the "definition includes both the rules for information exchange and transmittal ('format, tim-
ing, sequencing and error control') as well as the meaning of the information contained within
the protocol ('semantics')." CIS Response, supra note 92, 328.
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proceeding. In doing so, she accepted the stated rationale for the provi-
sion, which was to preserve, in the network context, the middleware
threat to the applications barrier to entry in the market for PC operating
systems.' 9' "Although this aspect of the remedy plainly exceeds the scope
of liability it is appropriately forward-looking," and thus in the public
interest, because it is "closely connected with the theory of liability in
this case and further[s] efforts to" prevent future monopolization.92
It accomplishes this goal by assuring that middleware on non-
Microsoft servers can interoperate as well with Windows client com-
puters as middleware on Microsoft servers.' 93 Although servers and
server-based applications do not reside on the PC, they nevertheless
"have the capacity to function in a manner similar to that of traditional
middleware by providing a layer between the operating system and the
top-level applications.' 94 Moreover, "given the rapid pace of change in
the software industry," without this sort of relief, "it is quite possible that
the core of the decree would prove prematurely obsolete."'' 95 The provi-
sion preserves "the new model of the 'platform threat"'' 96 and "ensure[s]
that the 'untraveled roads' toward illegal maintenance of a monopoly are
not 'left open.' ''
97
Judge Kollar-Kotelly rejected challenges to the limitations on the li-
censing requirement. First, she found that it would be inappropriate to
extend the requirement to non-native communications between Windows
and servers because, by definition, those communications use protocols
that are added to Windows, and thus do not "involve[] capabilities of the
monopoly product-the PC operating system," which Microsoft's anti-
competitive conduct was aimed at protecting.'98 Thus, Microsoft should
191. According to the government, the "competitive significance" of rival middleware
depended on data and applications on servers. The provision thus prevents Microsoft from
adding features to Windows client operating systems that would allow it to interoperate
"natively" with Microsoft server software, and yet deny to rivals the information about those
features that would allow their servers and server-based software to have the same opportuni-
ties to interoperate with Windows. CIS Response, supra note 92, I9. 313, 336, 460.
192. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90.
193. Id. at 189-90.
194. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 129. For example, in the states'
proceeding, the vice president of Novell "predicted that '[s]erver operating systems, if they are
a platform for enough applications and if they function efficiently with non-Microsoft client
PCs, could enable consumers to receive the applications they want using desktop PCs that run
non-Microsoft operating systems."' Id. at 123 (quoting Testimony of Dr. Carl S. Ledbetter
150). Thus, server/network computing might "challenge the applications barrier to entry in a
manner similar to that of Navigator and Java." Id. at 123. This goal would be facilitated by
disclosure of the interfaces Windows clients use to interoperate with servers. Id.
195. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
196. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F Supp. 2d at 129.
197. Id. at 130 (quoting Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947)).
198. Id. at 234-35.
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not be required to disclose the proprietary protocols used by its Micro-
soft Office Outlook email client (which is added to Windows) and
Microsoft Exchange Server.'99 Second, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that
requiring Microsoft to license its protocols without a reasonable royalty
would be "unduly confiscatory"2 °° and would inhibit innovation. Third,
restrictions on licensing to preserve security were reasonable. 20 ' Finally,
she found that the five-year time limit of the requirement,0  although
half the usual limit, was appropriate given the rapid pace of change in
the industry. A ten-year term would create "a substantial risk that the
decree will become highly regulatory in nature.,
20 3
The area of greatest uncertainty left open by the provision was the
extent of disclosure required. In defending the proposed decree during
the Tunney Act proceedings, the Department of Justice asserted that the
protocol licensing provision would ensure that software developers "will
have full access to, and be able to use, the protocols that are necessary
for software located on a server computer to interoperate with, and fully
take advantage of, the functionality provided by" Windows client operat-
ing systems, including Microsoft middleware included in the operating
system. °4 Moreover, because the protocols are to be licensed "for use"
by rivals to interoperate with Windows, "the licensing necessarily must
be accompanied by sufficient disclosure to allow licensees fully to utilize
all the functionality of each" protocol.2 0 ' A Windows client should inter-
act "identically" and "seamless[ly]" with Microsoft servers and
199. Id. at 234. D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F3d at 1224.
200. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
201. Judge Kollar-Kotelly upheld this provision. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 E Supp.
2d at 193-95.
202. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § V.A.
203. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
204. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2001), at 36, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9500/9549.pdf.
The government explained its understanding of what Microsoft must disclose:
Microsoft must license for use by non-Microsoft server operating system products
the Communications Protocols that Windows Operating System Products use to en-
able network services through mechanisms such as Windows server message block
protocol/common Internet file system protocol communications, as well as Micro-
soft remote procedure calls between the client and server operating systems.
Communications Protocols that permit a runtime environment (e.g., a Java Virtual
Machine and associated class libraries or competing functionality such as the
Common Language Runtime) to receive and execute code from a server also will be
required to be licensed for use by non-Microsoft servers if those protocols are im-
plemented in a Windows Operating System Product.
Id. at 38-39.
205. Id. at 38.
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non-Microsoft servers that have licensed the protocols. 2  Microsoft
never explicitly endorsed this interpretation.
3. The Technical Committee
The key enforcement mechanism applicable to Section III.E under
the consent decree is the Technical Committee (TC), a device originally
conceived during the first unsuccessful round of negotiations. The Tech-
nical Committee, composed of independent and impartial27 "experts in
software design and programming, is supposed to "assist in enforce-
ment of and compliance with" the decree2°9 by "monitor[ing] Microsoft's
compliance. 21° In doing so, it can receive and investigate complaints,'
interview Microsoft's staff and require them to produce information,
and study Microsoft's source code,213 subject to confidentiality require-
214
ments. Microsoft must provide space for the committee and pay for all
of its "reasonable" expenses, including salaries of any staff or consult-
ants the committee hires." 5 The committee must report to the
government semiannually 26 and whenever Microsoft fails to comply
with the decree.217
The consent decree also requires Microsoft to appoint an internal
Compliance Officer, who, although an employee of the company, is
separately obligated to "help[] ... ensure compliance" by receiving
complaints, by informing Microsoft's leaders of their obligations under
the decree, and by obtaining from them signed certificates that they un-
derstand those obligations. 218 The decree spells out the steps both the TC
and the Compliance Officer are to take to resolve the complaints each
receives. 219 Despite these provisions, the responsibility to enforce the
decree remains with the plaintiffs, who may conduct their own investiga-
206. Id.
207. The decree disqualifies individuals with ties to Microsoft or its opponents. Consent
Decree, supra note 1, § IV.B. 1. It provides that each side will select a member and those two
will select the third, all to serve 5-year, renewable terms. Id. § IV.B.3-4.
208. Id. § IV.B.2.
209. Id. § IV.B.1.
210. Id. § IV.B.8.a.
211. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § IV.B.8.d.
212. Id. § IV.B.8.b.
213. Id. § IV.B.8.c. Unlike the final judgment proposed by Judge Jackson, the consent
decree does not require the disclosure of Windows source code to third parties. Judge Kollar-
Kotelly held that this provision allowed all of the access necessary to the legitimate concerns
of the decree. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
214. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § IV.B.8.g., 9-10.
215. Id. § IV.B.6-8.
216. Id. § IV.B.8.e.
217. Id. § IV.B.8.f.
218. Id. § IV.C.
219. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § IV.D.
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tions and, on notice to Microsoft, apply to the court for an enforcement
order.
20
Judge Kollar-Kotelly emphasized that, although the TC is designed
to be impartial, and to assure fair and nonadversarial resolution of dis-
putes, it "exists to assist the government in enforcing the decree" and
therefore "should not be viewed as a hindrance or a cause of delay., 221 It
was not an impediment to the TC's role that its members will not have
legal expertise because that remains the domain of the plaintiffs. 22 Al-
though the committee's "work product, findings or recommendations"
are not to be used directly in legal proceedings, the plaintiffs may rely
on the TC's work to obtain their own evidence.224
Despite her endorsement of the TC under the consent decree, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly did not require the plaintiffs in the nonsettling states' pro-
ceeding to use it. Because the TC "exists largely to assist Plaintiffs in
enforcing the provisions of the final judgment,' '"25 it was up to the plain-
tiffs to decide whether to accept that assistance. Instead, the nonsettling
states have hired a consultant to assist with the technical aspects of their
obligations under the decree. Judge Kollar-Kotelly also approved the
states' proposal for a separate, somewhat more independent internal
compliance officer at Microsoft. 226 Despite these differences, the plain-
tiffs in both final judgments have coordinated their enforcement
efforts, 227 and there have been no public disagreements among them
about the enforcement process.
D. The European Commission Proceedings
The European Commission's antitrust investigation of Microsoft has
focused on streaming media players and on the interoperability of "low-
end," or work group, server operating systems with Windows PCs. After
rejecting Microsoft's settlement proposals in 2004, the EC decided that
Microsoft had abused its dominant position in violation of Article 82 of
the EC Treaty, the European counterpart of section 2 of the Sherman Act,
by tying the Windows Media Player to Windows and by refusing to dis-
close technical information in circumstances that hindered the
interoperation of Windows PCs and Microsoft servers with rivals' work
220. Id. § IV.A.
221. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
222. Id.
223. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § IV.D.4.d.
224. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 199-200.
225. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 182.
226. Id. at 182-83.
227. Joint Status Report on Coordinating Enforcement of the Final Judgments, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Apr. 17, 2003) [hereinafter JSR
April 2003] available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200900/200953.pdf.
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228group servers. It fined Microsoft almost €500 million and issued two
remedial orders.
First, the EC ordered Microsoft to "offer a version of Windows for
client PCs which does not include the Windows Media Player."229 Micro-
soft complied with this order by developing "Windows XP N," which it
released in June 2005 to the complete indifference of computer manufac-
turers and consumers. We will have little to say about this part of the EC
decision, other than to note that it suggests that government agencies
have a limited ability to identify market needs.
The EC's second order required Microsoft to disclose to its rivals, on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, "complete and accurate specifi-
cations for the protocols used by Windows work group servers in order
to provide file, print, and group and user administration services to Win-
dows work group networks., 230 The agency defined the relevant markets
as client PC operating systems, in which Microsoft is undoubtedly
dominant, and "work group server operating systems, 23' a segment in
which Microsoft has more than a sixty percent share.232 The EC found
that Microsoft had abused this "dominant position, 233 by refusing Sun
Microsystems' request that it disclose specifications that would help
Sun's Solaris server operating system interoperate with Windows client
PCs and Windows servers in work group networks.23 Although the EC
acknowledged that a unilateral refusal to deal is abusive only in "excep-
,,235 istional circumstances, it ordered disclosure based on its finding that
Microsoft's refusal put its rivals in the work group server operating sys-
tem market "at a strong competitive disadvantage ... to an extent where
there is a risk of elimination of competition. 236 The agency rejected Mi-
crosoft's argument that the American licensing program would meet any
legitimate need of its rivals because the program was not specifically
aimed at work group server operating systems237 and did not require dis-
closure of server-to-server protocols.238 The Commission limited its order
by assuring Microsoft that it need not reveal its source code or its own
228. Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82






233. EC Decision, supra note 228, 541.




238. EC Decision, supra note 228, 277-78.
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implementation of the specifications,239 and that it would be entitled to
reasonable compensation for turning over its intellectual property.240
In response to the EC decision, Microsoft has created its Work
Group Server Protocol Program, which licenses protocols "for more than
20 work group server services ... tasks and scenarios. 24' Nevertheless,
Microsoft has appealed the Commission decision to the European Court
of First Instance.242 In the meantime, the EC has aggressively enforced its
decision. In November 2005, the EC decided that Microsoft had pro-
duced inadequate technical documentation at unreasonable prices and
tentatively imposed a new penalty of C2 million per day unless Microsoft
complied by December 2005.243 In July 2006, the EC "definitively" im-
posed a fine of E280.5 million for failure to provide adequate technical
documentation, and increased the fine to E3 million per day after that.2"4
In March 2007, the EC "warned" Microsoft that its license fees were
unreasonable because their protocols "lack[ed] significant innovation"
and threatened further penalties.245
The EC's analysis of a monopolist's obligation to deal with its rivals
has been criticized as an application of European competition law,246 and
239. Id. [ 569. Microsoft, however, has revealed its server source code in an effort to meet
the demands of the EC for adequate documentation of the covered protocols. Press Release,
Microsoft Goes Beyond EU Decision by Offering Windows Source Code, (Jan. 25, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2006/jan06/01-25EUSourceCodePR.mspx.
240. EC Decision, supra note 228, in 1005-09.
241. See Microsoft Work Group Server Protocol Program (WSPP), http://
www.microsoft.com/about/legal/intellectualproperty/protocols/wspp/wspp.mspx (last visited
Oct. 5, 2007).
242. The court refused interim relief on the ground that Microsoft will not suffer irrepa-
rable harm before a final decision, because Microsoft has already licensed many of the
protocols. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp v Comm'n of the European Communities, 2004 WL
2951977, 4 C.M.L.R. 5 (2005) (Ct. of First Instance Dec 22, 2004). The oral argument in the
appeal occurred in April 2006, but a decision is not expected until late 2007.
243. Commission Decision of 11 October 2005 Imposing a Periodic Penalty Payment
Pursuant to Article 24(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 on Microsoft Corporation (Case COMP/C-
3/37.792 Microsoft), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/
decisions/37792/art24_1_decision.pdf.
244. Commission Decision of 12 July 2006 Fixing the Definitive Amount of the Periodic
Penalty Payment Imposed on Microsoft Corporation by Decision C(2005)4420 Final and
Amending that Decision as Regards the Amount of the Periodic Penalty Payment (Case
COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/
cases/decisions/37792/art24_2_decision.pdf.
245. EC Press Release, Competition: Commission warns Microsoft of further penalties
over unreasonable pricing as interoperability information lacks significant innovation (Mar. 1,
2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/269&
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
246. Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Where Antitrust Ends and IP Begins-On the Roots of the
Transatlantic Clashes, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 44 (2007); Roberto Pardolesi & Andrea Renda,
The European Commission's Case against Microsoft: Kill Bill?, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 513
(2004).
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is inconsistent with U.S. antitrust law."7 Nevertheless, the enforcement
.of the EC decision has influenced the enforcement of the protocol licens-
ing requirement under the U.S. final judgments. We note this influence
in the next part and briefly consider its propriety in Part V.
IV. THE PROTOCOL PROGRAM
In response to the protocol licensing requirement of the final judg-
ments, Microsoft created the Microsoft Communications Protocol
Program (MCPP).248 The MCPP is an access-controlled extension of the
documentation Microsoft provides online under the Microsoft Devel-
oper's Network249 and is similar to MSDN documentation in design,
format, and usage. The MCPP consists of technical documentation of the
covered protocols and a license to use the protocols on specified terms.
The technical documentation, currently available in a DRM250-protected
PDF format,251 is the tangible deliverable required by the final judgment.
As we saw in Part III, Microsoft must disclose the protocols that Win-
dows clients use to interoperate natively with Microsoft servers, so that
rival middleware vendors can compete with Microsoft middleware that
resides on servers. The scope and quality of this documentation has been
the most important focus of the enforcement and compliance efforts.
247. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004); see, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indetermi-
nacy of Economics: The U.S.IE. U. Divide, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 725, 730-32. Fox summarizes
Trinko:
In elaborating on the bases for the freedom-to-not-deal principle, the Court stressed
that duties to deal are duties to assist rivals, and duties to assist rivals usually harm
competition and innovation. Firms will tend to invest less in property that they must
share with rivals. Moreover, as for Section 2 duties in general, it is hard to distin-
guish illicit exclusion from legitimate competition, and "[m]istaken inferences and
the resulting false condemnations 'are especially costly, because they chill the very
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.'" Even apart from false positives,
the detailed supervision that a sharing obligation requires may be "'beyond the
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control."'
Id. at 731 (citations omitted); see also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Bargaining and
Monopolization: In Search of the "Boundary of Section 2 Liability" between Aspen and
Trinko, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 115 (2005).
248. See Microsoft Communication Protocol Program (MCPP), http://www.
microsoft.com/about/legal/intellectualproperty/protocols/mcpp.mspx (last visited Oct. 16,
2007).
249. The Microsoft Developer's Network, or MSDN. See generally Microsoft Developer
Network, http://msdn.microsoft.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
250. "Digital rights management" is a technology providing encryption services to en-
sure that non-licensees do not gain access to the technical documentation.
251. The TC required Microsoft to provide the documentation in Adobe's PDF format,
not Microsoft's own proprietary format.
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The MCPP license specifies the terms under which developers may
have access to the technical documentation. The final judgments allow
Microsoft to license the protocols "on reasonable and non-discriminatory
termS, 25 2 which include limitations designed to protect Microsoft's inter-
est in the security and value of its intellectual property. Pursuant to the
order, Microsoft may charge reasonable royalties ;253 limit the scope of
the license to what is necessary to satisfy the final judgment;254 prevent
licensees from assigning or sublicensing the licenses;255 withhold infor-
mation necessary to protect security features;216 and require licensees to
have a valid business purpose. 25 '7 The court must determine the reason-
ableness and nondiscriminatory character of the terms of the agreement,
including the price. Like the technical documentation, the license has
been a major focus of the remedy, and has continued to evolve through-
out the development period in response to feedback and criticism by the
plaintiffs and the licensees.
For clarity, we have divided the MCPP development period into four
stages: the initial responses began with the issuance of the proposed fi-
nal judgment in November 2001 ;218 recruitment began with the issuance
of the first Joint Status Report in April 2003;29 commercialization began
around the time of the European Commission's final decision; 2 0 and re-
set began in the spring of 2006.
A. Initial Responses
The proposed final judgment, entered in November 2001, required
Microsoft to make the Section III.E disclosures within nine months. At
this early stage, however, Section III.E was not viewed as the most chal-
lenging of the final judgment's requirements.26' To meet the deadline, ten
252. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § III.E.
253. Id. § 111..
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. § IlI.J.
257. Consent Decree, supra note 1, § III.J.
258. Stipulation and Revised Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. submitted Nov. 6, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9400/9495.pdf.
259. JSR April 2003, supra note 227.
260. See supra Part III.D.
261. In the July 3, 2003 status report, Section III.E is but one of many remedies in the
government's report to satisfy the other "forward-looking" portions of the Proposed Final
Judgment. For example, in that report, Microsoft announced publication (in the MSDN) of
"approximately" 290 new Windows API's intended to satisfy Section III.D. Joint Status Re-
port on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 22, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Jul. 17, 2003) [hereinafter JSR July 2003], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201100/201135.pdf. Later reports focus almost exclusively
on Section III.E.
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of Microsoft's technical writers created over 5000 pages of documenta-
tion, which Microsoft gave to the Technical Committee on August 6,
2002, along with the first version of the MCPP license.262 In the months
that followed, the government conducted a "careful and thorough" re-
view of the MCPP license terms, interviewed Microsoft personnel and
"various parties likely to be interested in the licenses," and reviewed out-
standing complaints about Microsoft's compliance with the requirements
of Section III.E.263 In the July 2003 status report, the government ex-
pressed concerns about the reasonableness of the terms of the MCPP
license, but not about the content of the disclosures.26
B. Recruitment
By July 2003, almost one year after the initial release of the docu-
mentation, only four companies had agreed to become MCPP
licensees.265 This low count troubled Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who stressed
she wanted to see more positive market effect.266 Although Microsoft
questioned the use of the number of licensees as the appropriate success
267standard, it joined the government in an effort to attract new licensees.
To ensure that the MCPP terms were "reasonable and non-
discriminatory,' 268 the government asked Microsoft to make nine signifi-
269cant changes to the MCPP license and to change its royalty structure.
Microsoft also undertook a substantial marketing effort to promote the
license. By January 2004, Microsoft had promoted the licenses on-line,
at trade shows, in direct sales activities, and in full-page advertisements
262. Id.
263. Microsoft Consent Decree Compliance Advisory-April 21, 2003,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200900/200957.pdf. The complaints referred to are not enu-
merated or identified in the public documents.
264. JSR July 2003, supra note 261, at 8-9.
265. Id. at 22-23.
266. "Plaintiffs informed the Court ... that Plaintiffs hoped to see progress in terms of
additional licensees. The Court agreed, noting that it 'was very, very concerned' about how
Section III.E. had been working and wanted to observe the impact of Microsoft's revised li-
cense in the marketplace." Interim Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the
Final Judgments at 3-4 (citing Transcript of Jul. 24, 2003 status meeting), United States v.
Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Oct. 17, 2003) [hereinafter IJSR Oc-
tober 2003], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201300/201386.pdf.
267. Id. at 15 ("The fact that a larger number of third parties have not licensed Micro-
soft's communications protocols ... does not evidence either non-compliance by Microsoft or
a failure of the final judgments to achieve their purpose.").
268. JSR July 2003, supra note 261, at 9 ("Plaintiffs are most concerned with Micro-
soft's implementation of the requirement of Section LI.E that it license certain
Communications Protocols on reasonable and non-discriminatory ("RAND") terms.").
269. Id. at 8. Among the changes were: Microsoft agreed to remove a non-disclosure
agreement that potential licensees had been required to sign, and to reduce the cost of royalties
due to Microsoft for license of the Communications Protocols.
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in major newspapers.27° It also announced plans to simplify its licenses
and to make many of the protocols available on a royalty-free basis . 7' By
April 2004, the number of licensees had increased to fourteen, including
general server licenses" for Sun Microsystems and SCO Group.
During this period, the DOJ surveyed technology companies that had
turned down license offers. Some responded that one of the license terms
was objectionable-the royalty was too high, or they needed source code
as well as the specification, or there were too many legal restrictions on
using the protocols. Others responded that they did not need the proto-
cols for their development programs. Still others responded that they
lacked staff with the technical expertise sufficient to implement the pro-
tocols or to understand the legal requirements of the license.2 7 ' The
January 2004 report cited a complaint "regarding the sufficiency and
completeness of the technical documentation that Microsoft provides to
MCPP licensees. ' 74 The government apparently concluded from its in-
vestigation that the license and the technical documentation were not
accessible enough to be commercially successful.
75
C. Commercialization
The third major period began in early 2004 and lasted over two
years. The slow rate of adoption by licensees continued to create pressure
for Microsoft to expand the benefits of the MCPP license. Microsoft
made many of the standard or published protocols available online under
a "royalty-free" license, relaxed the terms of the license and extended its
270. Microsoft's "evangelization" of the protocol licenses involved "full-page adver-
tisements in both the Wall Street Journal and the San Jose Mercury News;" "banner
advertisements on nineteen leading technology-focused Internet Web sites, including a num-
ber of Web sites targeting developers for non-Microsoft platforms such as Java and Linux;"
"direct mail and newsletters to the software developer community;" individual contacts; and
"outreach meetings with potential licensees at trade shows." In addition, "Microsoft contacted
each of more than 100 entities that had previously been approached about the original MCPP
to describe the benefits of the revised MCPP and communicate its willingness to negotiate
flexible terms." IJSR October 2003, supra note 266, at 10-11.
271. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments, at 15,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Jan. 16, 2004) (here-
inafter JSR January 2004], available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f202l00/202129.pdf.
272. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments, at 4,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Apr. 14, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter JSR April 2004], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f203200/203264.pdf. By this
time, in an effort to increase the licensee adoption rate, Microsoft had set royalty rates based
on the functional tasks of products using the license. In the January 2004 Status Report, the
breakdown of eleven licenses was: one general server, six media streaming, two file server,
two terminal services, one certificate services. JSR January 2004, supra note 271, at 5. The
"general server" license is the original MCPP license allowing use of all MCPP protocols.
273. JSR January 2004, supra note 271, at 7 (report on survey of rejecting companies).
274. Id. at 8-10.
275. JSR April 2004, supra note 272, at 4.
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duration, and provided each licensee with a full-time dedicated account
manager.16 In November 2005, Microsoft added a 500-hour "premier"
technical support and consulting package for each licensee.77 The retail
value of this package by itself exceeded what Microsoft first asked for a
license deposit.278 Most significant, Microsoft made its source code
available. Under the final judgments, only the Technical Committee was
authorized to examine the Windows source code 279 and consult Microsoft
engineers. Nevertheless, Microsoft modified the license in February
2006 to allow licensees access to Windows source code and committed
to provide individualized training in how to use it.280
In July 2004, the Technical Committee reported the creation of a
forty-page written "standard" against which it would measure the docu-
mentation's technical adequacy.' To meet the standard, it was no longer
sufficient for Microsoft to disclose documentation and make it available
276. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 4-5,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Jul. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
JSR July 2004], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f204500/204560.pdf.
277. Supplemental Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judg-
ments at 10, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Nov. 18,
2005) [hereinafter SJSR November 2005], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f213100/213109.pdf.
278. Premier technical support packages available to consumers from Microsoft include
a dedicated account representative, access to "real" engineers, and 24/7 support. Very conser-
vatively, at $125/hour, a 500-hour package of consulting alone would be worth $62,500. See
Microsoft Premier Support, http://www.microsoft.com/services/microsoftservices/srv_
prem.mspx(last visited Oct. 16, 2007). Contrast this value with the $50,000 originally required
for a licensee to enter the MCPP project as a deposit against future royalties.
279. Microsoft was ordered to make the source code available to the Technical Commit-
tee from the outset. See supra Part lII.C.3.
280. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 4,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Feb. 8, 2006) ("Plaintiffs'
initial assessment is that the source code will, in combination with the technical documenta-
tion and technical support provided by Microsoft, assist MCPP licensees in implementing the
MCPP protocols by answering questions that licensees may have based on review of the rele-
vant technical documentation.") [hereinafter JSR February 2006], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2l4500/214518.pdf. This substantial concession by Microsoft
occurred two weeks after the government released a public "Response" in which it demanded
that Microsoft "dramatically increase the resources devoted to responding to technical docu-
mentation issues in order to get its performance under the [guidelines for acceptable response]
back on track." Plaintiffs' Response to Microsoft's Supplemental Status Report on Microsoft's
Compliance with the Final Judgments at 2-3, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(CKK) (D.D.C. filed Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Plaintiffs'Response January 2006], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2l4200/214204.pdf.
281. JSR July 2004, supra note 276, at 11 ("Microsoft has created a detailed set of speci-
fications for these enhancements and has devoted a substantial team of employees to
implementing them in the technical documentation."); see also Joint Status Report on Micro-
soft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 4, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-
1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Oct. 8, 2004) ("[A] 40-page specification for technical document
improvements ... was created in consultation with the Technical Committee.") [hereinafter
JSR October 2004], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f205700/205751 .pdf.
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on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. Microsoft was now re-
quired to show licensees how to use the protocols. Perhaps the most
surprising requirement of the new standards was the formation of sub-
stantial ancillary software development projects by both Microsoft and
the Technical Committee. The Technical Committee hired software and
network engineers who began to field test the protocols by creating
small, stand-alone programs called "prototype implementations,""' each
intended to prove out a particular protocol as described in the documen-
tation. The theory of this undertaking was that if the documentation were
adequate, then the Technical Committee's engineers should have no dif-
ficulty writing implementations. Under this program, the TC reported
problems they encountered in implementing the protocols, and asked
Microsoft to resolve them within seven, seventeen, or thirty-two days,
depending upon the importance of the issue.283 Although the Technical
Committee expressed growing dissatisfaction with the documentation, it
regularly expressed satisfaction with Microsoft's cooperation.
2 4
To measure Microsoft's progress, the TC tallied the number of tech-
nical "bug reports" in its implementation program and the number
Microsoft had managed to resolve. The reporting during this period is
replete with charts comparing these numbers. In February 2006, the
Technical Committee reported that it had submitted "over 1,000 issues to
Microsoft,"285 but Microsoft had resolved only 300. Notice that "bug," in
this context, is not a defect in the protocols themselves, which presuma-
bly work for Microsoft's software, but an ambiguity or error in the
explanations of how to implement the protocols in new software.286
282. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 3-4,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Jan. 25, 2005) ("[T]he TC
... will oversee a one-year project to create prototype implementations of each [protocol]
covered by the MCPP.... The goal of this project is not to create reference implementations
or commercial-quality software. The resulting prototype implementations have no independent
value.") [hereinafter JSR January 2005], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f207200/207283.pdf.
283. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 4,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Oct. 19, 2005) [hereinaf-
ter JSR October 2005], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/]212100/212195.pdf
284. JSR July 2004, supra note 276, at 5 ("Plaintiffs are satisfied that Microsoft has
implemented the commitments made during the last Status Conference.").
285. JSR February 2006, supra note 280, at 8.
286. In the reports, the Technical Committee refers to bug reports as CARs, or "correc-
tive assistance requests," and later as "TDI's." For example, a report might be as simple as a
spelling or grammatical error, or there might be a technical inaccuracy. Apparently, each time
that the Technical Committee's engineers discovered what they believed to be any variance
between what the published MCPP documentation should describe and what appeared on the
network, a bug report was filed. Also, whenever the engineers had difficulty completing a task
(e.g. finding some necessary information), it appears a bug report was also filed. Microsoft's
answers in the status reports suggest that it considered some proportion of these bug reports to
be based on a lack of engineering skill in interpreting the documentation rather than explicit
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Microsoft initially gave the count of applicable protocols as around
2811
one hundred,"' and later discovered around thirty more.288 It might ap-
pear surprising that such a small number of protocols would require so
much documentation and so many person-hours of testing. The complex-
ity stems from the definition of the appropriate documentation and the
means used for testing it. The Technical Committee has required docu-
mentation and related services that approximate a step-by-step tutorial-
far beyond a minimal technical disclosure. This interpretation seems to
stem from the government's interpretation that Section III.E requires
disclosure "sufficient... to allow licensees fully to utilize all the func-
tionality of each Communications Protocol.2 89 Moreover, the TC has
tested the documentation by actually using it-an approach that can gen-
erate a large number of issues, including the proper sequencing of
multiple protocols "on the wire," interactions between protocols, error
codes which may arise and troubleshooting of problems. It is unclear
whether the "bugs" generated in this process were a true measure of the
quality of the MCPP. Microsoft suggested in late 2005 that it was "un-
aware of any existing or potential licensee that has been unable to use
,,290
any Communications Protocol because of flaws in the documentation.
Microsoft, for its part, agreed to develop a set of "protocol parsers"
for use by the Technical Committee (and presumably, by licensees) for
troubleshooting its prototype implementations. A "parser" translates a
block of text or code like a protocol into a human-readable format. A
protocol might be analogized, in this context, to the numbers a taxpayer
enters on a complex tax return. If the numbers were distributed on an
otherwise blank sheet, a computer could interpret them, but they would
make no sense to a human being. If, however, one were to place a trans-
parency of the printed form over the sheet so that the numbers
corresponded to the appropriate boxes, a human could understand the
return. A parser, like the transparency, is a kind of form that reveals the
human-readable format of each communications protocol. Because each
errors. Because the early corrections focused largely on improving the accessibility and us-
ability of the documentation, it seems Microsoft initially believed that the Technical
Committee's reviewers needed only better access to the documentation rather than any sub-
stantive changes. JSR October 2004, supra note 281, at 10-11 (reporting delivery of the
documentation in a new format featuring improved search and navigation and more diagrams,
in addition to new technical content).
287. JSR July 2003, supra note 261, at 22.
288. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 11,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinafter
JSR March 2007], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f221700/221759.pdf.
289. Competitive Impact Statement at 36, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(filed Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9500/9549.pdf. The final
judgments require Microsoft to make the protocols available "for use" in interoperation.
290. JSR October 2004, supra note 281, at 14-15.
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protocol is different, a different parser must be written for each one. The
basic idea is to provide a quick way for an engineer to "see" what is in-
side the protocol by identifying and labeling the individual parts of the
data inside the protocol. For these reasons, parsers are useful for debug-
ging and troubleshooting complex network protocols. 9'
Microsoft's parser development was initially conceived as an exten-
sion of its NetMON product to include the additional MCPP Protocols.
NetMON, short for "network monitor," is an existing Microsoft tool,
available for free to developers. It parses network traffic and shows some
network protocols. NetMON is a low-end member of a category of net-
work "packet sniffers" or "monitors," including free, open-source, and
commercial variants.' 9' It attaches to a network, captures a stream of
network traffic by saving the protocols to a disk as they come across the
wire. Then it allows the user to select individually identified protocols
and view them through a parser.
In January 2005, Microsoft was supposed to release a parser for each
protocol as each parser was completed. The Technical Committee's en-
gineers would use each newly released parser to help write a prototype
implementation that would prove the sufficiency of the documentation
for that protocol.293 The Technical Committee recognized at the time that
the project was of a "substantial scope," and was thought to require "ap-
294proximately" another full year to complete. This approach
contemplated an iterative process in which Microsoft and the Technical
Committee would refine the documentation in a series of progressive
approximations until the TC determined that it was suitable for use by a
licensee.9  The parser templates developed by Microsoft for use by the
Technical Committee would be available for use by licensees as well.
At some point between January and June 2005, Microsoft and the
Technical Committee decided to expand the scope of the parser devel-
opment project beyond just creating additional parsers for the MCPP
291. For more information about computer parsers, see Parsing, Wikipedia.com,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parsing (last visited Oct. 16, 2007). See also "Network Monitor
Parser," Microsoft MSDN, http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-uslibrary/ms709219.aspx (last
visited Oct. 16, 2007).
292. Compare NetMON with Wireshark, a popular open-source network sniffer. See
Wireshark Home Page, http://www.wireshark.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
293. JSR January 2005, supra note 282, at 5 ("The two projects will therefore proceed
on parallel tracks. Plaintiffs and Microsoft believe that the two projects, combined, provide a
realistic mechanism to ensure the overall completeness and accuracy of the documentation.").
294. Id.
295. Id. ("Accordingly, the documentation available to licensees will improve in quality
and accuracy throughout the course of the project work.").
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protocols.296 "Troika" was the code name for the expanded (and, it turned
out, overly ambitious) requirements for the NetMON project. Troika
embraced three formidable objectives: the addition of the MCPP parsers;
real-time identification and parsing of protocols against "actual client-
server network traffic," as opposed to working from captured data in
files; and an interface with the MCPP to provide instant and automatic
verification of each disclosed protocol against the documentation. 297 This
tool would have helped the Technical Committee prove that the docu-
mentation was accurate as compared to "real" protocols. By late 2005,
however, it became obvious that the January projection of a year to com-
plete the project had been too optimistic,'" and that, in a "best case"
scenario, Troika would be completed in October 2006.299 However, the
plaintiffs had "little confidence that ... this project [would] result in
substantial improvements to the technical documentation in a timely
manner."3' ° Despite an enormous effort featuring scores of programmers,
the Troika project's scope and its relationship to the TC's prototype im-
plementation work were scaled back and the time limits extended.3"" By
August 2006 Microsoft announced that NetMON was "complete," ap-
parently without the Troika features.3 2
These efforts led to substantial increases in staffing for both Micro-
soft and the Technical Committee. The status reports during this period
included regular exhortations by the government for Microsoft to add
more resources to the project and reports by both parties on the numbers
of staff acquired. By May 2006, Microsoft reported having "more than
210 Microsoft employees and contingent staff ... involved in work on
296. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 3,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. filed June 1, 2005) [hereinafter
JSR June 2005], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f209300/209307.pdf.
297. JSR October 2005, supra note 283, at 6-7.
298. SJSR November 2005, supra note 277, at 3 (observing that "the project proved
much more technically complex than Microsoft had anticipated and required much more time
to complete than Microsoft had estimated at the outset" because of "technical challenges,"
including "developing this complex and unique set of parsers for dual purposes, the volume of
the test data (tens of terabytes), and dependencies between the parser development project and
the validation tool").
299. JSR October 2005, supra note 283, at 7.
300. Id.
301. SJSR November 2005, supra note 277, at 4-8.
302. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 16,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
JSR August 2006], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f218000/218096.pdf. Even
though the Troika objectives were ultimately discarded, the NetMON 3.0 version offers many
feature improvements over the prior 2.1 version, although it is not clear how the new features
have much in relation to the Section III.E requirements.
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the technical documentation."30 3 This constituted a twenty-fold increase
over the number of staff Microsoft reported having used in 2002 to com-
plete the first MCPP documentation. ' For its part, the Technical
Committee's staff increased ten-fold from four at the outset of the pro-
ject3°5 to forty by August 2006.'° For both organizations, the employees
added were predominantly experienced senior engineers, senior techni-
cal writers, and management staff.
In October 2005, the plaintiffs reported they were "pleased with both
the progress made by the TC and Microsoft's cooperation in the pro-
ject ' 307 and predicted completion by August 2006.08 Just three months
later, however, the government publicly criticized Microsoft's commit-
ment in a unique "Plaintiff's Response."3°9 In February 2006, Microsoft
offered licensees the Windows source code license, perhaps in an at-
tempt to ameliorate deteriorating conditions.3"0 By May 2006, however,
the Joint Status Report concluded that the project was at a "watershed,"
and the entire project must, again, be reconceived. 1
D. Reset
The fourth and current period began in May 2006. Sometime be-
tween October 2005 and May 2006 the Technical Committee's staff
reached an impasse in producing prototype implementations. The TC
found that a high percentage of Microsoft's responses to the issues the
TC reported were insufficient. Whatever the source of the crisis, Micro-
soft appointed Robert Muglia, a senior vice president and one-time vice-
president in charge of server products, as the manager in charge of the
Microsoft side of the project.31 Muglia decided that the "process of try-
ing to fix issues identified by the TC one at a time" had failed and
proposed instead that "Microsoft will rewrite substantial portions of the
documentation, taking advantage of what it has learned during the last
several years, including all of the specific reports from the TC.,,313 The
303. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 21,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. May 12, 2006) [hereinafter
JSR May 2006], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f216100/216127.pdf.
304. JSR July 2003, supra note 261, at 22.
305. JSR July 2004, supra note 276, at 9 (reporting an increase of staff from 4 to 6).
306. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 10.
307. JSR October 2005, supra note 283, at 3.
308. Id. at 5 (estimating completion by July 2006, revised from the original date of Feb-
ruary 2006).
309. Plaintiffs'Response January 2006, supra note 280, at 2-4.
310. JSR February 2006, supra note 280, at 3-4.
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plaintiffs viewed Muglia's contributions as so important that they suc-
cessfully proposed that Judge Kollar-Kotelly modify the judgment to
require his retention by name.
3
14
In August 2006, the plaintiffs announced that the parties had agreed
to develop a new "overarching specification" for the technical documen-
tation."5  The new specification replaced the January 2005
"comprehensive plan to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the
technical documentation, '31 6 which in turn had replaced the 2004 "stan-
dard" for the documentation.3" The new specification reflects the
leadership of Muglia on the Microsoft side, combined with a new formal
collaboration between the Technical Committee and the European
Commission's Monitoring Trustee.318 The new specification is to involve
a rewrite of the technical documentation, eventually replacing the bulk of
the work performed to date, while incorporating everything Microsoft
has learned while trying to meet the prior standards, as well as comple-
mentary requirements from the EU documentation standards.3 9 The
parties recognized the specification as a substantial new project3 2° that
required extension of the term of the final judgment for up to five more
years 1 and another increase in staffing. 2
314. Modified Final Judgment § WVE, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(CKK) (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f218300/
218339.pdf.
315. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 13.
316. JSR January 2005, supra note 282, at 3.
317. JSR July 2004, supra note 276, at 11.
318. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 3, 5 ("The TC and Microsoft [used] as a start-
ing point the specification agreed upon between Microsoft and the European Commission's
Monitoring Trustee [to create the new specification] .... The TC and the Monitoring Trustee
plan to hold regular calls to discuss developments. Plaintiffs believe that such regular contact
between the technical experts on both sides of the Atlantic will prove useful to both programs,
promote convergence, and allow for the sharing of knowledge and expertise.").
319. JSR May 2006, supra note 303, at 6-7.
320. However, there does not appear to be complete agreement as to how much time and
investment will be required. See JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 4-9.
321. Modified Final Judgment § V.A, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(CKK) (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f218300/218339.pdf. The Modified final judgment provides for an extension until November
2009, but upon stipulation by the parties, at the government's sole discretion, this may be
extended until November 2012.
322. By June 2007, about 350 Microsoft employees were working on the U.S. and Euro-
pean protocol programs, including 150 engineers. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's
Compliance with the Final Judgments at 23, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232
(CKK) (D.D.C. Jun. 19, 2006) [hereinafter JSR June 2007] ("Significant attention and in-
volvement in the technical documentation and the MCPP extend through all levels of the
Microsoft organization and draw upon the resources of numerous product engineering, busi-
ness, technical, and legal groups, as well as company management."), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms-pdfs/press/2007-06-19_FinalJSR.pdf.
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The new specifications stem from a core set of three agreed-upon
"templates," which are based in turn upon three categories of proto-
cols. 3 23 The required new documentation has been grouped into six
"milestones,"324 each with an assigned initial delivery, revision, and final
delivery date.325 In 2007, Microsoft reported the on-time delivery of draft
versions of five of the milestones.326 Microsoft also reported employing
over 300 employees to create the MCPP documentation.3 7 The Technical
Committee, while not exactly blessing the new documentation, initially
reported a favorable impression.328
In August 2006, Microsoft also announced the voluntary suspension
of fees and royalty payments as a condition of licensing the MCPP pro-
tocols. Furthermore, existing licensees were given a prospective credit
against royalties. Microsoft agreed to this suspension of fees until the
government determines that the documentation pertaining to each type of
licensee is "substantially complete. 329 In 2007, Microsoft agreed that, if
the plaintiffs determined that Microsoft was not making adequate pro-
gress in improving the documentation, the royalty holiday could be
extended for three years beyond the time the plaintiffs determined that
the documentation was substantially complete.330
323. See JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 3 ("The parties reached a provisional
agreement on the content of three specification templates for different categories of documen-
tation").
324. There were originally five milestones. In the March 2007 Joint Status Report, Mi-
crosoft reported the addition of a new "Longhorn" milestone covering approximately thirty
"new" protocols. Microsoft explained that ten of the new protocols were newly developed for
the Windows Longhorn Server product; ten should have been included in the original set; and
ten are ancillary and are required to make the documentation of the original protocols under
the new overarching specification more comprehensive. JSR March 2007, supra note 288, at
11-12.
325. Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 9,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (CKK) (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
JSR November 20061, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f219800/219800.pdf.
326. JSR March 2007, supra note 288, at 10 ("The Initial Availability Milestone 3
documents were delivered to licensees on February 21, 2007. The feedback from the TC re-
garding the quality of this newly rewritten documentation has been positive"). In June 2007,
Microsoft reported continued progress in meeting the milestones. JSR June 2007, supra note
322, at 17-18.
327. JSR March 2007, supra note 288, at 18; JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at 23.
328. JSR March 2007, supra note 288, at 3 (finding "that the discipline and structure
inherent in using the prescribed templates has succeeded in producing documentation that is
easier to use than the prior version of the documentation"); JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at
3 (finding it "encouraging ... that Microsoft has been able to keep up with the flow of new
[TDIs] being filed by the TC," and attributing this improvement to "(1) the overall improve-
ment in the quality of the documents prepared pursuant to the reset project, compared to the
old documents, which leads to TDIs that on average are less complex and easier to resolve;
and (2) the improvement in Microsoft's processes for handling these TDIs").
329. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 12.
330. JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at 5-6.
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The TC recognized that the rewrite under the new specification
would moot any ongoing prototype implementations that were based on
the pre-rewrite documentation."' Curiously, though, the TC expressed its
intention to continue using its engineers to develop prototype implemen-
tations based on the old pre-rewrite documentation, at least until the
replacement documentation for each protocol was received 3 2 Similarly,
it appears that the TC intends to develop the prototype implementations
in spite of Microsoft's commitment to produce the test suites.
Possibly the most significant development in this period is Micro-
soft's undertaking to develop protocol "test suites," yet another new
software development effort. A test suite is a software application spe-
cifically designed to prove out a subset of technical functionality. Each
test suite is a stand-alone application corresponding to each protocol,
designed to prove that the protocol functions as documented and, unlike
the TC's prototype implementations, to serve as an exemplar for licen-
sees. In November 2006, Microsoft reported working with the TC to
develop a set of test suites to demonstrate protocol functionality.333 To the
extent that the TC's prototype implementation project was similarly de-
signed to prove out the technical documentation by implementing
software incorporating each protocol, the test suites would therefore
seem to make the TC's prototype implementation project redundant.
In June 2007, Microsoft reported that it had delivered the first "pre-
liminary cluster" of test suites at the end of March, and would deliver a
second by the end of June.34 Because development of the test suites is
potentially a major shift of responsibility between the two parties, and
certainly represents a substantial new benefit for licensees, it is curious
that the TC's portion of the November 2006 report is silent as to this de-
velopment, and the March 2007 and June 2007 reports only mention the
test suites in passing.335 The TC's lack of discussion of the test suites
perhaps suggests an absence of complete agreement between the TC and
331. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 5-6 ("The TC has continued its current proto-
type implementation activity on a provisional basis using the existing documentation... [and]
once Microsoft delivers the new documentation for a particular protocol, the TC will suspend
reporting issues on the previous version of the documentation for that protocol; at that point,
the TC will use the new documentation....").
332. In June 2007, Microsoft reported that it still had over 400 TDIs outstanding in the
old documentation. JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at 19.
333. JSR November 2006, supra note 325, at 11-12; see also JSR March 2007, supra
note 288, at 17 ("Microsoft anticipates delivering clusters of test suites to the TC and to licen-
sees on a quarterly basis.").
334. JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at 21-22.
335. Id. at 2-3 ("Microsoft has committed to rewriting the technical documentation
pursuant to an agreed-upon specification, providing additional support to licensees in the form
of "plugfests" and interoperability labs, developing a test suite to enable testing of the com-
pleteness and accuracy of the documentation, and supporting the TC's testing efforts.").
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Microsoft concerning this development effort. Furthermore, since the TC
expressed its intention to continue development of the prototype imple-
mentations despite the duplicative nature of the work, the TC may lack
confidence that the test suites will be sufficient to prove the documenta-
tion.336
In the March 2007 report, the government was critical of Microsoft
for failing to meet deadlines and for discovering previously unreported
protocols.337 Still, in spite of the general concerns that it expressed, the
government reported a high proportion of bug reports as closed,3 8 and
that the quality of the documentation had "meaningfully" improved.339
The government did, however, caution that "significant" additional work
will be required to test and validate the rewritten documentation.3 40 The
June 2007 report gave a somewhat more favorable assessment, but again
stressed the need for additional testing before reaching a firm conclu-
sion."4 Presumably, this also means that the TC's large staff of engineers
will be retained to complete the significant additional work. The June
2007 report also expressed continuing concern about Microsoft's discov-
ery of new protocols. The TC planned to scrutinize Microsoft's "protocol
audit" procedures with the assistance of two outside consulting firms.4 2
Microsoft reported in June 2007 that twenty-nine companies had
agreed to license some or all of the MCPP technologies from Microsoft
under the now-suspended royalty program.343 Most of these licenses have
been for limited tasks like media streaming or for the "Proxy/Firewall"
task.34 Only six are general-purpose licenses.34' Another twelve had
obtained the royalty-free license to open and published protocols.3 6 Only
thirteen licensees had shipped products using the MCPP. A survey of
336. JSR March 2007, supra note 288, at 5 (noting that "the TC has begun using these
rewritten documents in their prototype implementation work").
337. Id. at 6 ("Plaintiffs are concerned that Microsoft has not been able to meet its origi-
nal schedule and are particularly troubled that at this late hour in the program Microsoft is still
discovering protocols that should have been included in the original documentation.").
338. Id. at 5 ("The TC determined that the rewritten documentation resolved 15 of the 19
60-day TDIs filed against the old documentation.").
339. Id. at 4 ("The TC's initial review of the Milestone 2 documents suggests that their
overall quality is meaningfully higher than that of the Milestone 1 documents.").
340. Id. ("Significant additional testing ... [and] eventual validation testing-is neces-
sary to assess their completeness and accuracy.").
341. JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at 3.
342. Id. at 4-5.
343. Id. at 16.
344. By June 2007, three more proxy/firewall licenses had been issued, in part because it
was "least expensive (to the licensee) royalty-bearing task within the MCPP." JSR June 2007,
supra note 322, at 12-13.
345. Id. at 14-15. Of these, three were shipping products, two had not even accessed the
documentation, and one had gone out of business. Id. at 15.
346. Id. at 16.
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licensees indicated that many did not intend to use the license for prod-
uct development.47
Microsoft has created an outreach program designed to teach licen-
sees both how to use the MCPP and how to use the protocols in live
products. This outreach took two forms: "plug-fests" and a permanent
interoperability lab. A plug-fest is a scheduled event at which licensees
can get hands-on assistance from Microsoft engineers with testing and
debugging their use of the Protocols in the licensees' hardware and soft-
ware projects.148 The first plug-fest was held December 12-14, 2006, and
focused on streaming media protocols.3 9 Only two licensees attended the
plug-fest, but they received "access to laboratory testing facilities, in-
depth technical discussions regarding the protocols, Network Monitor
and protocol parsers, Windows client-based test cases, Windows Server
reference implementations, and subject matter experts."35 The interop-
erability lab is a facility in which "licensees can test and debug their
protocols and obtain on-site access to Microsoft engineering assistance.
The lab [provides] a testing facility, training, best practices, trouble-
shooting and technical support for licensees implementing protocols
from the MCPP documentation."35' Despite "a series of in-person visits
to licensees '352 to promote the lab and in spite of the fact that the services
were free, only one company had used the lab as of June 2007.353
V. WHAT WENT WRONG?
The protocol licensing program has had meager success in signing
up licensees. As we will see, the most plausible explanation for this
shortfall is that few developers want to pay royalties to use Microsoft's
proprietary protocols. Most would prefer to develop their own Windows
347. Id. at 13.
348. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 6 ("Microsoft agreed to sponsor "plug-fest"
events at which several companies can test and debug their protocol implementations with the
goal of improving interoperability amongst each other and with Microsoft.").
349. Streaming media represents the largest portion of the licensees, with proxy/firewall
a close second. JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at 16.
350. The Technical Committee also signed up, making total attendance three firms. JSR
November 2006, supra note 325, at 13. Four licensees attended the file server plug-fest in
April and May of 2007. JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at 22.
351. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 6.
352. JSR March 2007, supra note 288, at 17.
353. JSR June 2007, supra note 322, at 11-12. The California Group polled licensees
about why they did not use the lab. Two indicated that they had self-certified their product.
The others apparently gave no explanation. Nevertheless, the California Group concluded that
the lab may help licensees "at that stage in product development when the MCPP-using prod-
uct is ready for evaluation testing" and thus "ongoing access of the Interoperability Lab
facility to licensees remains a potentially useful ancillary feature of the MCPP." Id. at 12.
Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy
client, to develop their own protocols, or to use standard protocols with-
out a license. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs have pressed on with demands
for greater inducements and improved documentation, which the Techni-
cal Committee has measured, at great cost, against a series of
specifications. In retrospect, we can see that the protocol licensing re-
quirement was flawed at its conception. First, there was no showing that
the program responded to any real market need. The conduct it most di-
rectly addressed was not found to be illegal, while the conduct it
indirectly addressed, although illegal, was not proven to have had any
anticompetitive effect. Second, it required the creation of a new, expen-
sive, and technically complex program that the court was not well
equipped to supervise.
A. The Failure to Attract Licensees
The stated goal of the protocol licensing requirement was to assure
that middleware running on non-Microsoft servers would be able to
compete with Microsoft's server-based middleware. Although servers
and server-based applications had little or nothing to do with the liability
holdings in the government's case, mandatory protocol licensing was
thought necessary to preserve a viable "platform threat" in the increas-
ingly network-oriented environment to replace the threat previously
posed by the Netscape browser and Java. Thus, one key measure of the
success of the protocol licensing requirement is the number of products
that implement the licensed protocols in ways that might pose a platform
threat to Microsoft's OS monopoly. A more modest goal, although not
one supported by the liability holdings, would be substantially to en-
hance interoperability in heterogeneous networks. By either of these
measures, the protocol licensing program has not succeeded.
When the program's failure to attract licensees started to become
apparent early in the enforcement period, Judge Kollar-Kotelly report-
edly "was very, very, concerned,"354 and directed the parties to redouble
their efforts to increase the numbers. In January 2004, the plaintiffs re-
ported that eleven firms had signed licenses. Even this number, however,
overstated the success of the program. All but one of the licensees at that
time indicated that they intended to use only a limited category of
protocols-file, terminal, or certificate services or media streaming.
Only one of the licensees planned to use the protocols for "general
server" tasks, the sort of wide-range license that might "interact with the
Windows desktop in a variety of ways"-presumably the sort of use that
might lead to the emergence of a new platform. The plaintiffs expressed
354. JSR October 2003, supra note 266, at 3.
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concern that "the development efforts of the current licensees are not
likely to spur the emergence in the marketplace of broad competitors to
the Windows desktop." '
In response to this realization, the government surveyed firms that
had not taken licenses in an effort to find out the reasons for their
choices. The survey revealed that the firms had found that:
(1) some particular aspect of the licensing program is not attrac-
tive (royalties too high, need source code rather than a
specification, too many limitations on use of [communication
protocols], etc.); (2) the Microsoft [communication protocols]
are not necessary for the companies' product development; or
(3) the company for various reasons did not invest the business
and legal expertise to evaluate the MCPP or the technology.
'35 6
Since that survey, enforcement and compliance efforts have addressed all
of the possible reasons mentioned in categories (1) and (3). The royalties
have been reduced and simplified. Indeed, until the plaintiffs determine
that the technical documentation is substantially complete, Microsoft is
currently providing a one hundred percent credit against reported royal-
ties "owed prospectively."357 Microsoft has evangelized the product by
advertising and showing potential licensees its capabilities. Licensees
have been given access to extensive technical support, although few ap-
parently take advantage of what is available. Only two licensees showed
up for Microsoft's first plug-fest, and none has taken advantage of the
interoperability lab, although one proxy/firewall licensee has signed up
to do so. Microsoft has also given licensees access to Windows source
code.
Despite all these measures, of the thousands of firms developing ap-
plications for servers, only twenty-nine have taken royalty licenses for
Microsoft's protocols while twelve more have signed the royalty-free
licenses for published and industry-standard protocols. Only fourteen
products have been introduced using the protocols, and none apparently
has platform potential. So far as we can tell, none of the fourteen prod-
ucts produced by these licensees has any platform potential, much less
the potential to rival Windows as general-purpose platform. Only six
licensees have taken the general server MCPP license. These results
would be a catastrophe for a commercial product. They are no less tell-
ing for a governmentally supervised program.
355. JSR January 2004, supra note 271, at 5.
356. Id. at 7.
357. JSR May 2006, supra note 303, at 12.
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The continuing dearth of licensees and products, despite the enor-
mous efforts to make the license and the documentation attractive,
suggests software firms have not chosen the license mainly for the rea-
son the government identified in category (2) of its survey: most
software developers have no use for a license of Microsoft's communica-
tions protocols in any form and at any price. As Microsoft has noted:
developers can choose among a variety of efficient ways to
achieve interoperability with Windows that do not require them
to license Microsoft's protocol technology, including developing
their own technology or using industry-standard protocols built
in to Windows. Section III.E required Microsoft to provide de-
velopers with a new option-the opportunity to build upon the
same protocol technology that Microsoft uses to achieve inter-
operability between its client and server operating systems-and
Microsoft has done that.
358
Alternative means of achieving interoperability-developing a Windows
client or using standard protocols-are generally adequate, and have the
advantage of not requiring the developer to pay royalties to Microsoft. A
firm contemplating an application that might compete with Windows as
a platform would be particularly loath to choose a development path that
depended upon a license of Microsoft's technology.
B. Failures in Enforcement
Given the evidence that there was little appetite for the protocol li-
censes, the plaintiffs' ever-increasing demands over the years for
enhancements of the licensing program are questionable. One might
have thought at the time the decree was entered that disclosure and li-
censing of communications protocols would have been a relatively
straightforward matter. In its memorandum supporting the comparable
provision in the proposed remedial order in 2000, the government wrote
that "Microsoft already routinely documents and distributes technical
information, so the provision will not place a significant burden upon
it."'359 After the negotiation of the consent decree, the government recog-
nized the novelty of the protocol licensing program, and that it would
impose a burden, but still believed nine months was sufficient to develop
360disclosure programs.
358. JSR January 2004, supra note 271, at 15.
359. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 40-41, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. April 28, 2000).
360. After negotiating the consent decree, the government was more realistic. It justified
the nine-month delay in implementation of the protocol licensing requirement on the ground
that it imposed a far greater burden than the API disclosures. Although it routinely licenses its
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The magnitude of the burden, however, depended on how broadly
the plaintiffs interpreted the disclosure obligation. Only around 120 pro-
tocols are supported natively in Windows. Microsoft had already
implemented the relevant protocols for its own use. When Microsoft
made its initial disclosure of the identified protocols in August 2002, it
apparently thought it had substantially met the requirements of Sec-
tion III.E. Certainly, once Microsoft had made available to licensees the
Windows source code that included the relevant protocols, one would
have thought that it had made the protocols available. The plaintiffs,
however, presumably with the approval or insistence of Judge Kollar-
Kotelly, have interpreted the licensing requirement to require Microsoft
to create documentation and provide whatever other services that might
help other firms implement the protocols.
Despite the early recognition that the licensing requirement was not
achieving its stated goal, and despite the existence of a plausible expla-
nation that the product was not responding to a market need, the
plaintiffs have continued to press Microsoft to meet a shifting list of re-
quirements to make the protocol program more attractive. Some of these
requirements have been relatively easy, if expensive, to meet. Others,
however, have required Microsoft to undertake substantial product de-
velopment efforts. Under the Technical Committee's supervision,
Microsoft has been required to create the Microsoft Communication Pro-
tocol Program, develop technical documentation of all identified
protocols, respond to reported documentation problems, develop soft-
ware to test the documentation, evangelize the protocols to software
developers, create a support group for licensees, designate account man-
agers, provide extensive technical support, hold plug-fests, and set up an
interoperability lab. Most recently it has undertaken the development of
test suites for each protocol, in effect duplicating the testing efforts of
the TC.
APIs, "Microsoft historically has licensed or disclosed relatively few of its Communications
Protocols." Moreover:
unlike the APIs that must be disclosed if they are used by Microsoft Middleware,
which is a relatively finite set of products, Communications Protocols must effec-
tively be available for license by third parties if they are implemented natively in a
Windows Operating System Product and they are used to interoperate or communi-
cate with any Microsoft server operating system product, including cases where
extra software code is added to the server operating system product. This opens up
what is potentially a very broad universe of new disclosure and licensing obliga-
tions for Microsoft. Microsoft needs time to set up programs to meet these
obligations.
CIS Response, supra note 92, 340.
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This process has been costly. Microsoft has devoted the efforts of
350 employees plus the expertise of one of its most senior executives,
Robert Muglia, to the process. This commitment of personnel entails
costs not only of salary, but the opportunity costs of distracting employ-
ees and executives from more productive pursuits. Testing Microsoft's
work product has required travel to India by both Microsoft employees
and the staff of the Technical Committee. The TC has hired forty staff
members and maintains offices in both Redmond and Silicon Valley.
Both sides have devoted substantial legal resources to supervision of the
judgments and compliance with them.
No end to this process is in sight. The entire judgment was sched-
uled to expire on November 12, 2007. In September 2006, however, the
parties agreed to modify the judgment to extend the provisions applica-
ble to the protocol licensing requirement until November 12, 2009, with
the plaintiffs given the "unilateral" right to renew the extension to No-
vember 12, 2012. Thus, the decree has effectively been doubled in
duration, despite Judge Kollar-Kotelly's recognition that lengthy decrees
may be unduly regulatory, especially in a highly innovative environment.
The mushrooming expenses and delay are largely attributable to the
Technical Committee's Kafkaesque, ever-shifting specifications for the
technical documentation. In 2004, the Technical Committee created a
forty-page written standard against which the documentation's technical
adequacy may be measured.6 In January 2005, it announced a "compre-
hensive plan to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the technical
documentation. 362 Most recently, in August 2006, the TC announced a
new effort to develop a "new overarching specification" for the technical
documentation.3 63 The specifications have held Microsoft to a host of
short- and long-term deadlines and milestones. Along the way, the as-
sessments of the project have fluctuated. The plaintiffs have gone from
expressing satisfaction "with both the progress made by the TC and Mi-
crosoft's cooperation in the project ' 364 in October 2005 to the conclusion
in May 2006 that the project is at a "watershed" and must be completely
reconceived again.363
The Technical Committee has measured the quality of the documen-
tation by creating prototype implementations of each protocol, and
reporting as "bugs" any difficulties it identifies in the process. The bugs
are not problems with Microsoft's own implementations of the protocols,
which presumably work fine. They are problems in the TC's efforts to
361. JSR July 2004, supra note 276, at 11; JSR October 2004, supra note 281, at 10.
362. JSR January 2005, supra note 282, at 3.
363. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 13.
364. JSR October 2005, supra note 283, at 3.
365. JSR May 2006, supra note 303, at 3.
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use the protocols in different implementations. It is difficult to determine
what the reasons for these bugs are. They may stem from problems in the
documentation. If so, however, the bugs reflect the intrinsic complexity
of the task-the TC has only rarely questioned Microsoft's cooperation
and commitment of resources. On the other hand, the bugs may be a
function of the TC's own technical or institutional limitations. Although
undoubtedly expert, the TC is not a development firm and has very dif-
ferent incentives. Much like a special prosecutor, it is charged with a
single task regarding a single target firm, and has an unlimited budget.
Its goal is not to meet a real market need and to turn a profit, but to set a
standard of perfection and hold Microsoft to it at any cost. No commer-
cial entity has any such goal.
Perhaps the clearest indication that the plaintiffs have lost their way
is the "convergence" with enforcement of the EC's work group server
remedy. The new "overarching specification" adopted in August 2006
was based on "the specification agreed upon between Microsoft and the
European Monitoring Trustee. 366 The decision of the plaintiffs in the
American case to adopt the specification from the EC case was the result
of "productive discussions" between the TC and the Monitoring Trustee
that would continue in the interest of "convergence. 367 But it is inappro-
priate for standards of compliance under the U.S. judgment to converge
with the remedy in a decision so clearly at odds with Sherman Act stan-
dards. The Sherman Act's monopolization standards and those for abuse
of dominance under Article 82 of the EC Treaty are very different, as
U.S. enforcement officials have recognized.368
The link to the European case is revealing in another respect. In its
2004 order, the EC also determined that Microsoft had abused its domi-
nant position by tying the Windows Media Player to Windows, and it
required Microsoft to "offer a version of Windows for client PCs which
does not include Windows Media Player. 3 69 Microsoft shipped its "Win-
dows XP N" in June 2005, which complied with that order, but no
computer manufacturers would install it on new PCs, because they could
detect no demand for a product with less functionality than a full-
featured product at the same price. Like this aspect of the European case,
the protocol licensing program forces Microsoft to create a product that
few would want.
366. JSR August 2006, supra note 302, at 3.
367. Id. at 5.
368. William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, London, North Atlantic Competition Policy: Converging Toward What? 8 (May 17,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/224128.pdf (criticizing the use
of monopoly leveraging theory), at 8.
369. EC Decision, supra note 228, 1 1011.
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C. Failures in Conception
The protocol licensing plan has failed largely because its original
concept was flawed, because it imposed costly relief without a showing
of market need, and because it created a program that the court was not
institutionally suited to supervise. The clearest market need for an anti-
trust remedy is to remove illegal conduct. As we noted in the
introduction, courts should normally deploy antitrust injunctions only to
prevent illegal actions that cannot be adequately addressed through de-
terrent penalties. Microsoft has already settled numerous private
lawsuits, with payouts running well into the billions. The courts in Mi-
crosoft recognized that any remedial order should be "tailored to fit the
wrong creating the occasion for the remedy."3 70 Even in affirming the
protocol licensing requirement, the court of appeals recognized "the dif-
ficulties inherent in crafting a forward-looking provision concerning a
type of business conduct as to which there has not been a violation of the
law."'37' In attempting to block "'untraveled roads ' '3 72 that the defendant
might conceivably take to monopolize, the court may unwittingly "pre-
vent the defendant from forging new routes to serve consumers. 373
The protocol licensing provision violates these principles. It was
only indirectly connected to any proven illegal action. The type of con-
duct that the decree is aimed at blocking-introducing incompatibilities
between Microsoft's products and those of its rivals-was actually held
to be legal in the absence of deception or exclusionary conditions. The
affected technologies-server-based middleware and communications
protocols-were only obliquely mentioned in the findings of fact. In-
deed, the idea for mandating disclosure of communications protocols
was suggested by Microsoft's rivals during the first settlement negotia-
tions, after the record was closed. Because the focus of the case was on
other products, there was a scant record on which to base a remedial or-
der. Even during the remedial phase of the proceedings, there was only a
limited factual inquiry into the need for such a provision. Judge Kollar-
Kotelly heard testimony about various "bad acts" by Microsoft in the
network context, but ruled the evidence irrelevant to the remedy because
it was unconnected to Microsoft's illegal actions. Yet the judgments
impose a sweeping, prophylactic disclosure requirement that is not de-
pendent on a showing of deception, exclusionary intent, or
anticompetitive effect.
370. D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d 34, 107.
371. D.C. Circuit 2004 Remedy, 373 F.3d 1199, 1223.
372. Id. (quoting Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947)).
373. Id. at 1224.
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It may be that, in some circumstances, "forward-looking" or "fenc-
ing-in" relief is appropriate. In Microsoft, however, the court imposed
these new obligations without any evidence that the disclosures the pro-
tocol licensing provision required were even wanted by a substantial
number of firms . Indeed, the available evidence tended to show that
licensing of Microsoft's proprietary protocols was unnecessary. Judge
Kollar-Kotelly recognized that "[tihere are a variety of methods used to
overcome differences between client and server capabilities '375 of which
native interoperation is only one. Developers may rely on standard pro-
tocols or may add their own software to Windows. Experience has now
shown that these alternatives are, in most instances, not only adequate,
but preferable. It was only much later, after Microsoft had made the ini-
tial disclosures, that the plaintiffs asked developers whether they even
wanted licenses of this technology. In that survey, the government
learned that many developers did not want the licenses regardless of the
price or the quality of the documentation. Logic suggests that such a
survey would have been appropriate before imposing such a costly obli-
gation.
A court considering whether forward-looking relief would respond
to a market need, should also consider the standard of proof. The courts
in Microsoft also recognized that there should be "a proportionality be-
tween the severity of the remedy and the strength of the evidence of the
causal connection," and between the conduct and maintenance of market
power.76 The protocol licensing provision is also inconsistent with this
principle. The illegal actions to which the disclosure requirement was
most directly linked-Microsoft's measures to disadvantage Netscape's
browser and Java-were only found to be anticompetitive "by infer-
ence," because there was no proof either technology would have become
a competing platform in the absence of Microsoft's actions. Judge Kol-
lar-Kotelly found that the nonsettling states produced no new evidence of
causation in the evidentiary hearing during the remedial phase. This
dearth of evidence of causation was a sufficient basis to reject any form
of structural relief. It should also have foreclosed relief only remotely
connected to any proven illegal conduct.
374. Cf Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolution of the Intellectual Property Concept,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 1369, 1392-93, (noting how one of the settling state attorneys general
observes that, despite its recognition that regulatory decrees are problematic, the government
"accepted this more regulatory decree as a political compromise, which was forged in the
context of a somewhat narrow remand from the court of appeals and a change in policy views
at the Department of Justice occasioned by the installation of a new administration. In context,
the disclosure provisions looked like a possible way to advance competition.").
375. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 122.
376. D.D.C. 2002 Tunney Act, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 164.
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In effect, the remedy treated the protocols Microsoft supports
natively in Windows as if they were an essential facility, subject to man-
datory access. The Supreme Court has cast doubt on the validity of the
essential facilities doctrine under the Sherman Act.377 Even if it were ap-
plicable, however, it would require a showing that rivals "cannot
compete effectively without it and that duplication or practical alterna-
tives are not available. 3 78 As we have seen, it was practical, if not
preferable, to compete in the server market without the license of Micro-
soft's protocols.
Apart from failing to respond to a proven need, the protocol licens-
ing provision required an unduly regulatory process of implementation.
The courts in Microsoft recognized that antitrust courts should, except in
narrowly defined cases, avoid imposing regulatory injunctions that in-
volve detailed governmental supervision of firms' choices and terms of
dealing. Judge Kollar-Kotelly, for example, rejected the nonsettling
states' expert's suggestion that Microsoft's disclosure obligation should
be guided by the "parity principle," historically used in the telecommu-
nications context to measure access obligations.379 She reasoned that the
expert was unable to predict exactly what the effects of borrowing such a
standard would be on Microsoft, its rivals, and consumers in a "pure an-
titrust context." She endorsed the defense expert's prediction that the
parity principle would require "a massive regulatory regime" that might
"place the judiciary in a role for which it is not well-suited.380 She en-
dorsed the Supreme Court's caution that the court should not impose a
remedy that "involve[s] the judiciary in the administration of intricate
and detailed rules" because the "judiciary is unsuited to affairs of busi-
ness management. 38' Yet the implementation of the protocol licensing
requirement has not only involved the plaintiffs and court in business
management and the development of new products. It has also involved
direct supervision of price and quality in an extraordinarily fast-moving
and technical field.
377. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004) ("We have never recognized such a doctrine ... and we find no need either to recog-
nize it or to repudiate it here."). For an argument that the doctrine should be abandoned, see
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 244-48
(2005).
378. Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852 (1989).
379. D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 231-33.
380. Id. at 232.
381. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 163 (1948); see also Areeda,
supra note 378, at 853 ("No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or ade-
quately and reasonably supervise.").
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The government and the court knew from the start that such a pro-
gram was novel. Many protocols are industry standards and there was
scant evidence that Microsoft did not support these widely adopted stan-
dard protocols without requiring a license. In some instances, Microsoft
has added propriety extensions in order to distinguish the performance of
its products-as indeed any firm can do-without licensing them. To
require Microsoft to disclose and license those proprietary extensions
went well beyond any existing licensing program. Microsoft, of course,
licenses and documents APIs as part of its program of evangelizing the
Windows platform. Not surprisingly, the provision of the final judgments
requiring disclosure of APIs used by Microsoft middleware products has
created few problems of enforcement. Protocol licensing is different.
The government recognized that Microsoft's disclosure obligation would
involve a novel program to license protocols for use with a wide range of
products. 82 Such a requirement would force Microsoft not merely to dis-
close its own implementation of its protocols, but also to adapt that
disclosure to be meaningful for others' implementations. It was predict-
able that this obligation would require resolution of issues that would be
comprehensible only to members of the Technical Committee and Mi-
crosoft's engineers, well beyond the ability of a generalist judge to
resolve.383
VI. CONCLUSION
The final judgments require Microsoft to disclose and license pro-
prietary protocols in an effort to preserve, in the increasingly important
environment of network computing, the "middleware threat" to the Win-
dows monopoly. Almost five years after Microsoft produced the first
versions of the technical information and the license, after numerous
revisions of both, and at the cost of thousands of hours of effort by ex-
perts on both sides of the litigation, the middleware threat remains a
chimera. It is now clear that the program is not responsive to real reme-
dial or market needs. The lessons for future cases are clear: courts should
not undertake regulatory decrees that are not necessary either to interdict
the repetition of illegal conduct or to meet a proven market need.
382. CIS Response, supra note 92, U 170-71.
383. Cf United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1982) (rejecting
proposals for a regulatory decree on the ground that it would be impractical to enforce).
